D 635 
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■Greater Prosperity Through Greater Foreign Trade 



European 
Economic Alliances 



A Compilation of Information on 
International Commercial Policies 
After the European War and 
Their Effect Upon the Foreign 
Trade of the United States 



\m 



ALSO AN ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN AND UNITED 

STATES COMMERCIAL INTER-DEPENDENCE 

AND TREATY RELATIONS 



Complied Under the Direction of the 
Secretary of the 

NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL 

INDIA HOUSE, HANOVER SQUARE 
New York Citj 



October^ igi6 

(Second Edition) 



11 '^ . 



NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL 

The first National Foreign Trade Convention at Washington, May 27-28, 
1914, recognized the need of an organization which should "endeavor to 
co-ordinate the foreign trade activities of the nation," and authorized the 
creation of the National Foreign Trade Council for that purpose. 

The Council has an authorized maximum membership of fifty merchants, 
manufacturers, farmers, railroad and steamship men and bankers, represent- 
ing all sections of the United States and collectively standmg for the general 
interest of all elements engaged in foreign trade. 

Non-political and non-partisan, its function is investigatory and advisory, 
and it seeks effectively to co-operate with other organizations in the encour- 
agement of sound national foreign trade policy. Through its committees the 
Council is constantly investigating, and from time to time publicly reports 
upon problems arising in oversea commerce. 

The membership of the Council is as follows: 

Chairman: James A. Farrell. .President, United States Steel Corporation, New York City 

Treasurer: Walter L. Clark • • • -New York City 

Secretary: Robert H. Patciiin • •• -New York City 

John J. Arnold Vice-President, First National Bank, Chicago, 111. 

Willis H. Booth ..... .Vice-President, Security Trust & Savings Bank, Los Angeles, Cal. 

JAG Carson President, Carson Naval Stores Co., Savannah, Ga. 

E A. S. Clarke President, Lackawanna Steel Co., New York City 

Samuel P. Colt President, United States Rubber Co., New York City 

Maurice Coster. ..... Managing Director, Westinghouse Elec. Exp. Co., New York City 

John Crosby Washburn-Crosby Co., Minneapolis, Minn. 

F. G. Crowell Vice-President, Hall-Baker Grain Co., Kansas City, Mo. 

Robert Dollar President, The Robert Dollar Co., San Francisco, Cal. 

J. J. Donovan Vice-President, Bloedel-Donovan Lumber Mills, Bellmgham, Wash. j 

John F. Fitzgerald Boston, Mass J 

J. Rogers Flannery. . .Chairman, Pittsburgh Foreign Trade Commission, Pittsburgh, Pa. , ^^m 

P. A. S. Franklin Vice-President, International Mercantile Marine, New York City •*" 

L S Goldstein New Orleans Association of Commerce, New Orleans, La. 

Lloyd C. Griscom ' New York City 

B. F. Harris Farmer, Champaign, 111. 

Fairfax Harrison President, Southern Railway Co., Washington, D. C. 

H. G. Herget Pekin Wagon Co., Pekm, 111. 

Louis W. Hill Chairman, Great Northern Railway Co., St. Paul, Minn. 

Henry Howard .-..Vice-President, Merrimac Chemical Co., Boston, Mass. 

Charles E. Jennings President, C. E. Jennings Co., New York City 

Alba B. Johnson President, Baldwin Locomotive Works, Philadelphia, Pa. 

D. W. Kempner Galveston Cotton Exchange, Galveston, Tex. 

Cyrus H. McCormick President, International Harvester Corporation, Chicago, 111. 

J. R. McWane President, American Cast Iron Pipe Co., Birmingham, Ala. 

H. C. Lewis General Manager, National Paper and Type Co., New York City 

— Chas. H. Muchnic. . .Vice-President, American Locomotive Sales Corporation, N. Y. City 

Barton Myers President, Chamber of Commerce, Norfolk, Va. 

M. A. Oudin 'Foreign Manager, General Electric Co., Schenectady, N. Y. 

William Pigott President, Seattle Car & Foundry Co., Seattle, Wash. 

Welding Ring • Mailler & Quereau, New York City 

John D. Ryan President, Anaconda Copper Mining Co., New York City 

William H. Russe President, Russe & Burgess, Inc., Memphis, Tenn. 

W. L. Saunders... Chairman of Board, Ingersoll-Rand Co., New York City 

Charles A. Schieren President, Charles A. Schieren Co., New York City 

Wallace D. Simmons President, Simmons Hardware Co., St. Louis, Mo. 

.Willard Straight Vice-President, American International Corp., N. Y. City 

G. F. Sulzberger ■ Sulzberger & Sons Co., Chicago, 111. 

Stewart K. Taylor President, The S. K. Taylor Lumber Co., Mobde, Ala. 

Eugene P. Thomas President, U. S. Steel Products Co., New York City 

F. A. Vanderlip President, National City Bank, New York City 

Daniel Warren Vice-President, American Trading Co., New York City 

J H Wheelwright President, Consolidation Coal Co., Baltimore, Md. 

Theo B Wilcox ...• President, Portland Flouring Mills Co., Portland, Ore. 

J N ' Willys President, The Willys-Overland Co., Toledo, Ohio 

Office of Council, India House, Hanover Square, New York City 



APR 



By Ti-anefef 

2 m^ 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 



<Tt Personnel of the Council ? 

'■>. ^ 

K Editorial Note 5 

. Introduction , y_i'j 

Measures After War g 

Possible Effect upon the United States 9 

Preferences with Neutral Markets 11 

Tariff Preferences Imply Ability to Negotiate 12 

New American Sources for Retaliation 12 

Difficulties of Treaty Making 14 

Flexible American Tariff Desirable 15 

Co-operation in Foreign Trade 15 

Resources of the Alliances 16 

Evolution of European Commercial Policy, 1815-1915 18-23 

Commercial Power — Political Power 18, 

Adam Smith 19 

Effect of German Protectionism 20 

Most-Favored-Nation Relation 21 

Paris Conference Resolutions 24-34 

Interpretation by French Minister of Commerce 29 

Participation of British Colonies , . . 30 

Mr. Asquith's Explanation 31 

A Colonial Expectation 32 

Lord Bryce's View 32 

Statement of Minister of War Trade " 32 

Carrying the Resolutions into Effect 35-37 

British Committee on Paris Resolution 35 

British Colonial Conference 36 

Subsidy for Anglo-Italian Trade 37 

The Russo-Japanese Alliance , 37 

Economic Alliance of Central Powers 38-41 

Austro-Hungarian Views 40 

Scandinavian Economic Conference 42-44 

Swedish Premier's View 43 

British Reply ^ 44 

Press Comment and Discussion 46-64 

British Comment 46-58 

London Times 46 

Manchester Guardian 48 

Dr. Dillon's View (London Daily Telegraph) 50 

London Daily Telegraph 52 

London Morning Post 53 

The Spectator S3 

London Economist 55 

Fairplay 57 

British Ministry of Commerce 57 



PAGE 

French Comment 58-63 

La Revue de Paris 58 

Economiste Francaise . . . 62 

German Comment 63-64 

Hamburger Nachrichten 63 

Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom '. .65-68 

Reciprocal Trading Relations and Tariflfs 65 

Allocation of Duties 66 

Influence of Conference on United Kingdom Tariff 67 

Shipping 69, 70 

European Tariff Systems Before the War 71-73 

European Commercial Treaty Relations 74-77 

Treaties Abrogated by War 74 

The Position of Turkey 75 

The Balkan Situation 76 

Tariff Relations of the United States with European Belligerents and 
Neutrals ■ 76 

European Interdependence 78-82 

European Transportation Relationships 83-85 

Foreign Trade Distribution of United States, United Kingdom and 
Germany 84 

American Foreign Trade Affected by the Conference 86-90 

Allies Predominate as a Source of Supply." 86 

Changes in Character of United States Foreign Trade 87 

Export Needs Sustained Supply 88 

United States Nearly Self-Supporting 89 

Destination of Exports 91, 92 

Allies Largest Buyers 91 

Special Charts : — 

Chart No. I. United States — Inter-European Commercial Treaty 

Fabric, Showing Treaties in Effect and" Those Abrogated by War, 

Inserted between pages 76, 77 

Chart No. II. Commercial Intercourse, United States-Europe. 

Inserted between pages 76, 77 
Chart No. III. Showing Commercial Relations Between England, 
France, Russia, Germany, U. S. A. and Principal British Depend- 
encies Inserted between pages 84, 85 

Chart No. IV. Foreign Sources of American Supply and Destina- 

tion of Exports 93-126 

Appendix A 127 



International trade is a Colossus standing zvith one foot on 
Necessity and the other on Convenience 



EDITORIAL NOTE 



'T^HIS pamphlet is designed to be expository rather 
than argumentative. Its purpose is to bring, in con- 
venient form, to all Americans the essential informa- 
tion concerning changing European commercial policies. 
It has been compiled as a part of the National Foreign 
Trade Council's function of investigation of problems 
arising- in foreign trade. No recommendations are in- 
cluded, the Coimcil not having acted upon the issues in- 
volved except insofar as they suggest the necessity of 
the tariff system including adequate resources for the 
encouragement of the foreign trade and its safeguard- 
ing from discrimination. 



As this w^ork goes to press Roumania entered the war 

on the side of the Entente Allies, but has not yet for- 
mally become party to the Economic Alliance. 



INTRODUCTION 

The purpose of this work is to give available and pertinent in- 
formation upon : 

(a) Changes in European commercial policy brought about 
by the war ; 

(b) Their effect upon the foreign trade of the United States. 



THE Economic Alliance of the Entente Powers, agreed upon 
at the Paris Economic Conference, June 14-17, 1916, and the 
discussion of a similar alliance among the Central Powers re- 
veal a disposition to substitute a system of trade preferences for the 
most-favored-nation relation upon which the commercial inter- 
course of Europe rested prior to the war. This relationship domi- 
nated the commerce of the world, into which, by virtue of its most- 
favored-nation treaty relations with the great commercial and indus- 
trial nations, the United States fitted to the great advantage, profit 
and prosperity of the American people. 

• A significant political and commercial grouping has occurred 
among the neutrals Denmark, Norway and Sweden, who have,, at 
least informally, invited the collaboration of the United States in 
the common interest of all neutrals during the war. They have also 
discussed the necessity of common action after the war. 

The question with which the National Foreign Trade Council, as 
a body created to study, in a non-political and non-partisan manner, 
problems arising in foreign commerce and to encourage the develop- 
ment of a sound national foreign trade policy, is concerned, is the 
effect upon the United States of inevitable readjustments of policy. 

Some authorities contend that the commercial preferences im- 
plied in the Paris resolutions are impractical, that they will flatten 
under pressure of the commercial dependence of European nations 
upon each other, including their enemies. This may be true of the 
distant future, but the present fact is that two European economic 
alliances already have been created, for the war abrogated the most- 
favored-nation relation between the powers which are now enemies. 
Commercial intercourse between them is forbidden and prevented 
by arms. The Paris resolutions relate to economic policy during 

9 



the war, during the "reconstruction period" and to permanent poHcy 
after the war. With the first-named, in which the blacklist figures, 
it is not the province of this pamphlet to deal. 

Measures After War 

The Paris resolutions declare: "The Allies agree that the 
benefit of this treatment (most-favored-nation) will not be granted 
to those (enemy) powers during a number of years to be fixed by 
mutual agreement." 

How far will "war after war" obtain? 

Since the United States, in the last normal year before the war, 
(1913) sent 77.61 per cent, of its exports to the belligerent countries 
and their colonies, and derived from them 72.83 per' cent, of its im- 
ports, any sweeping change of tariff, navigation or financial policy on 
the part of either group of Allies, and particularly upon the part of 
the Entente Allies, may seriously affect the domestic prosperity of the 
United States, in which foreign trade is a vital element. To British 
countries alone went half the total value of United States exports 
and from them were derived, one-third the imports. The excess 
of exports over imports in the two fiscal years ended June 30, 1916 
(22 months of which were occupied by war) gave the United States 
a favorable trade balance of $3,230,133,362. Since the European 
governments were unable to pay for these purchases in merchandise, 
they have surrendered gold until the gold reserve in the United 
States has far exceeded all records and supports a structure of 
domestic and foreign credit unprecedented in the world's history. 
The recovery of a portion of this gold reserve is essential to 
the restoration of European prosperity after the war, and this would 
logically seem to be one efifect of the economic alliances now being 
devised and the plans being laid for a more intensive competition 
which will bring back the trade which, by the curtailment of Euro- 
pean production and competition, has given American merchandise a 
greater access to European markets and a larger share of the trade 
of neutral countries. A violent reversal of the flow of gold would 
rudely disturb the structure of domestic bank credits reared upon it. 
The primary safeguard must be a stimulation of exports of the mer- 
chandise required in peace to take the place of the abnormal demand 
and prices for munitions and an abnormal export of other articles. A 
diminution of our present inflated export trade is inevitable, but the 
danger is that European co-operation and trade preferences may be 

8 



the nations i both all atces But ! .'"^P'^ '° '"'' ™='°'"" °f 

relative weigt of econlTcs a.fd ' '1 ™P°'""'= '° P"=«'- *e 

in the fo^uitiou of prir/^Li::::^^!::!^ ^^^"■™- 

of the' E ref^teuL^rrthe: ™f "^°'f ■'?= P^"^"' "^^ "^-^h' 
intention of the >. 't ra Po te rs Td """ 'r™ *^" '^ S'™" "'^ 
It will be noted J tL Pi "eT?"°" °' '""''""' E""P^-" * 
premise "that the.entra Po" r. ""' ^"^^^ "P™ *e 

with their allies, a !"!;t fn the I ' ^"'","7' '°'^^' '" ^°"^^« 

only survive the etb^l^n ' ^prrTu ttThar''^' ""' "" 
will assume all its aiHtude and .11 if 1 "' ^''^ "'°"»' 

ntuae and all its mtensity." 

Withni the Jintte o-rnnri fl^^ r- t 

signed Jnly 3, whU^C f te™,?- Tr r'^ "' ^'"^"^" 
policy of commerciao-operation i a, Far EaT" "" ' '""' 
trade significance by,an's vast war exports to R'ssif™ '"'''" 

.,, Possible l.ct Upon the United States 

ine foreign and c,pQf,v ^^^^ r , 

century has increased '"""'""'"^■•« of the United States for a 

increased influence of'' Uni ed c^lt""^ '"^' restrictions. The 
shipping, accompanyi the 'rin '^ ! '" '.°"'""™' banlcing and 
credLr is the outstavton'mi d T"'°" '™" '^*'°^ '" 

the United States is rent oned " r ,"' "' "' ""' ""'' 
only vaguely. "^ '" *" "^^o'l-fons, and neutrals 



looJtvrl"!^TZ7AmJ-'l^ "f' "' ^'"^ Conference 
to either enterprisctsi^td and "^ -^ T^"^^'' ''"™ ^^'^°""^ 
governments them% "' "' , 7 f/™'^""^'' by the 
for the encourage, ;fj° it «''^f'"?°.f A"-^'^' assistance 

developmentof n^lMu tri Id ^'^""='' '"^"* ^""^ '^^ 
L- ,• j: ., ''"'P<"^a-ry or permanent character or to a com 
Unat^on oftheseerent methods." An immediate re ul was an" 
nounced m the f,mg news despatch : 

"Londiugust I. -The government will ask Pariiament 

flTdecHh "'1^ ?' ''°'°°0 (*»' $250,000 yea ; 
for a deco the newly formed British and Italian Trading 

CorporatRegmald McKenna, Chancellor of the eLciZ^ 

See chapteEconomio ah; .^ „ . . 



■S„ ch.B.^Eco„„,nlo Ani.nc. of Centra, P„,v.„... p 



9 



)■ 



announced this in the House of Commons. The ccj-poration, 
which has a capital of £1,000,000, subscribed privately *fcy banks, 
is for the purpose of assisting trade and commerc/ between 
Great Britain and Italy." ^,' 

The permanent policy furthermore provides that ''in order to 
permit the interchange of their products, the Allies indertake to 
adopt measures facilitating mutual trade relations, both by the estab- 
lishment of direct and rapid land and sea transport service at low 
rates and by the extension and improvement of pct^tal, telegraphic 
and other communications." The foregoing, while qualified by a 
declaration that the joint policy shall "have regard to the principles 
which govern the economic pohcy of each country," obviously opens 
the way for preferential tariffs and possible ( departure from that 
most-favored-nation relation that exists througbput the world as re- 
gards shipping. Most nations now permit, expept in certain coast- 
wise commerce, the vessels of others to come jand go on a basis of 
equality with their own. ; 

// the members of either the Entente or the Central Economic 
Alliance seek by differential tariff duties to prefer each other and 
their respective colonies, a discrimination against the products of the 
United States will automatically be created.. 

If special shipping arrangements are caffried so far as artificially 
to create lower rates for Allied than for neutral commerce, the parity 
of ocean freight charges to and from American ports as compared 
with to and from European ports, which has been one cause of tolera- 
tion of American dependence upon foreign carriers, will be disturbed. 
Whatever may be the result of the resolvitions, evidence abounds 
that manufacturing enterprise in the Allied countries looks forward 
to preferential advantages in those countries-, which have shared the 
burdens of war. For instance, a co-operative export association has 
been formed in Canada, in the expectation that Canada will have 
unprecedented opportunities to secure a large volume ^^ business 
from other portions of the British Empire, as well as from the other 
Allied countries and that "the products of Canada will be preferred 
against the products of her great neutral conipetitor, the United 
States who has stayed outside of the war. ano^. has borne no part 
in the great sacrifice of life and money made by tl^e Allied countries. 

The tables on pages 84, 85 show that the U^^ited Kingdom de- 
rives from the United States 17.62 per cent, of th^^^ {^^^'l^^'^^^^^ 
sumes as compared with 25.68 per cent, from ^^^^T^\'\^^^^^ 
Empire, 8.83 per cent, from the Central Powers, ai^d 56.70 per cent. 

10 






from others, including, of course, Russia and Argentina. Now any 
reversion to the Chamberlain policy must mean, if it means any- 
thing, that the United Kingdom and the other Allies will seek to 
draw a greater proportion of foodstuffs from the Empire, and pre- 
sumably from Russia, than from the United States. Where, then, 
will the United States' surplus crop be sold if the policy is designed 
to supply the allied food needs only from allied countries? The 
same is true of raw materials for manufactures. Under such con- 
ditions how will the United' States, in whose exports foodstuffs and 
raw materials predominate, pay for purchases of manufactured 
goods from the Entente Allies ? Will the American foodstuffs and 
raw materials then naturally be diverted to the Central Powers, thus 
creating a credit which Germany and Austria will find it easy to 
liquidate in manufactures exported to the United States? ' 

What are the resources of the United States for any such fierce 
semi-political competition as the adoption of such a policy will usher 
in? Possession of vast natural wealth is an asset, but the one ob- 
jective of any European policy, one purpose of which is permanently 
to keep the lead in foreign markets, might be to permit the Allies 
in some manner to : 

1. Develop within the alliance all possible sources of raw ma- 
terials ; 

2. Purchase as cheaply as possible, through co-operative buying, 
raw materials not available within the alliance; 

3. Create, through tariff or shipping concessions or by subsidy- 
stimulation of export enterprise, a preference for allied manufac- 
tures over American manufactures in allied and neutral markets. 

Preferences With Neutral Markets 

With a tariff the United Kingdom will be in a position to claim 
concessions in neutral markets in return for continued free or favor- 
able admission to rhe vast market of the British Isles. Latin- 
American countries enjoying free trade in the United Kingdom now 
have, as in the United States, little or nothing to gain from negotia- 
tion, but if the British Government and similarly other European 
governments, should demand tariff concessions for their manufac- 
tures entering La tin- American countries, as the price of favorable 
treatment of Latin-American products, a serious obstacle would 
confront the ambition of the United States more largely to supply 
Latin- American needs in manufactured merchandise. 

Of course, the European need of cheap foodstuffs and raw 

11 



materials is a deterrent to the tariff taxation necessarily the basis 
for such reciprocity overtures. 

Tariff Preferences Imply Ability to Negotiate 

Will either the Entente or Central Economic Alliance continue 
to grant what really amounts to most- favored-nation treatment f to 
the products of the United States? In other words, assuming the 
adoption of a tariff * [for revenue or pi:otection] in the United King- 
dom, will the United Kingdom, France and Russia give the United 
States the same tariff treatment that they extend to each other and to 
their colonies, receiving in return no more favorable treatment than 
the United States accords German and Austrian products ? Or will 
they make the price of a favorable entry into their own markets an 
exclusive concession under the American tariff? The same query 
applies to any economic alliance of the Central Powers. 

New American Resources for Retaliation 

Appreciation of the necessity for retaliatory weapons if the 
majority of the great industrial nations should embark upon a policy 
of trade preferences and discriminations, is indicated in recent Amer- 
ican legislation. The Administration Shipping Bill provides for the 
regulation of rates of all vessels, foreign as well as American, touch- 
ing at American ports. The bill provides that the United States Ship- 
ping Board may disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement which 
it finds to be unjustly discriminatory "as between exporters from the 
United States and their foreign competitors, or to operate to the 
detriment of the commerce of the United States." The bill also 
gives the Shipping Board power to refuse clearance to any vessel 
refusing to take goods from firms blacklisted by any government. 

The General Revenue Bill has a stringent anti-dumping provi- 
sion rendering unlawful importation at a price substantially less than 
the actual market value or wholesale price in the countries of origin 
when imported or sold in the United States with the intent of de- 

^here was no more hardened free trader than he," said P^-^^^^^jf^^^^f^^^J^'ij;;^^^^^ 
"°"t Whl'l.''ct',™„' '„.t.o«. .x.e„a .0 other. t.r,« co„ce..,o.. "< ""«»« /„''^ 

TWsr°probaTO aufto.h. l.et fh.t ,ooa,t„B= .nJ raw m.terl.l. rather than com- 
™tltl". manofLture. have predomlnalea in mmt to Europe. 

12 



stroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of prevent- 
ing the estabHshment of an industry. Another "unfair competition" 
section of the same act imposes a double duty surtax upon any 
article imported under an agreement that the importer or any other 
person shall not use, purchase or deal in the articles of any other 
person, but the legitimate operation of exclusive agencies is 
exempted. 

When the Revenue Bill came before the Senate it was amended 
by provisions empowering the President during any war in which 
the United States is not engaged to refuse clearance to United 
States or foreign vessels discriminating against American citizens or 
commerce, and to deny clearance to vessels of foreign belligerents 
which deny American citizens or commerce the same privileges ac- 
corded other countries. This was frankly directed against the 
British blacklist. Also, when American products are prohibited or 
restricted in entry into a belligerent country, the President was em- 
powered to prohibit or restrict the entry of similar products from 
such belligerent; or if similar articles be not imported, such other 
articles as he deems necessary in the public interest. 

The three provisions above enumerated are "enabling legisla- 
tion" rather than mandatory legislation, for they vest discretion in 
the President. 

Neither high nor low protectionists, nor revenue tariff ad- 
vocates, will deny that the present American tariff is not a bargain- 
ing tariff, although it provides that the President, for the encourage- 
ment of foreign trade and other purposes, may negotiate commercial 
agreements, subject to the approval of Congress. The duties on manu- 
factures were placed as low as radical prudence permitted and for 
purely domestic reasons, related to the cost of living, so many natural 
products and raw materials were free-listed that upwards of 60 
per cent, of the total value of all imports now enter the United States 
duty free. Ninety-five per cent, of the imports from South America 
are already on the free list, and with exception of Cuba, the same 
proportion of imports from Central America; while 90 per cent, of 
the imports from Africa, 97 per cent, of those from Oceania and 
79 per cent, of those from Asia pass our customs houses without 
yielding a cent of duty. The countries in these rapidly developing 
parts of the world have little to gain from negotiation with the 
United States, and since Europe is also a heavy customer and a 
source of capital they are doubly disinclined to accord the United 
States a concession not equally extended to Europe. The American 

13 



tariff law is, therefore, in its present form, practically barren of 
resources either for concession or retaliation ; but in fairness it 
should be said that when the law was enacted, the foreign trade of 
the United States presented no such need for negotiation as promises 
to arise after the war. Its authors evidently contemplated future 
changes, for the law gave the President authority to negotiate com- 
mercial agreements "for the purpose of readjusting the present 
duties and, at the same time, to encourage the export trade." 

Difficulties of Treaty Making 

Immediately the war ends, a period of commercial treaty read- 
justment will begin. More treaty making will be in progress in the 
five years after the declaration of peace than in any similar period 
of the world's history. The most-favored-nation relation which the 
European governments have permitted the United States to enjoy, 
despite frequent American tariff changes and the extension of Amer- 
ican tariff preferences to Cuba and to the colonies acquired from 
Spain, may not easily escape jeopardy. Many of the treaties be- 
tween the United States and European governments are ancient, with 
obsolete phraseology out of tune with modern expression of a new 
treaty system. 

Even with no European disposition to discriminate, certain 
changes in these treaties will be inevitable if only to bring their pro- 
visions into harmony with the new agreements. 

This renders highly important the United States treaty-making 
power. Their parliamentary system gives European governments a 
superior efficiency in treaty making as compared with the United 
States, where the treaties are negotiated by the Executive, subject to 
the ratification of the Senate by a two-thirds vote ; and, in the case of 
agreements affecting the revenues, he must obtain the approval of the 
House of Representatives. The history of commercial treaties in the 
United States is marked by frequent senatorial disregard of the 
recommendations of the State Department. The Dingley Act pro- 
vided that the President might negotiate reciprocity treaties for the 
encouragement of American foreign commerce. He did so. The 
Senate declined to act upon them. 

The State Department now lacks, but should immediately pro- 
vide, skilled resources for study of the entire treaty situation. The 
education of American public opinion upon treaty legislation is 
necessary. The necessity of a two-thirds Senate vote for ratification 
requires that treaties hereafter be so drawn as to command general 

14 



approval, a difficult task which can be accomplished only by the most 
careful consultation of public opinion prior to negotiation, the most 
skillful handling of the American case in the exchanges, and con- 
vincing presentation of the facts to the public in order to command 
sentiment in favor of ratification and maintenance of the treaty pbli- 
gation afterward. 

Flexible American Tariff Desirable 

To meet the conditions created by the possibility that European 
Economic Alliance on the part of either the Entente or Central 
Powers, might create discriminations against American trade, the 
National Foreign Trade Council at its Third Annual Meeting in 
New York, September 21, 1916, declared that the United States 
tariff system "whatever be its underlying principle," should "pos- 
sess adequate resources for the encouragement of the foreign trade 
of the United States by commercial treaties or agreements or execu- 
tive concessions within defined limits, and its protection from undue 
discrimination in the markets of the world." The Council declared 
its desire to co-operate with the government and the United States 
Tariff Commission, when organized, and with other organizations in 
the interest of "a better public understanding of the foreign trade 
aspect of the tariff problem." 

(See text oi Resolution in Appendix "A".) 

Co-operation in Foreign Trade 

Even before the war American producers of raw material and 
manufactures were obliged to cope with combinations of foreign 
rivals organized to resist American competition and often to sell to 
combinations of foreign buyers equipped to depress the prices of 
American products. Under the anti-trust laws business men have 
doubted the legality of meeting foreign combinations with American 
co-operation designed to prevent American producers being played 
against each other by the foreign purchasing syndicates. Exporters 
have hesitated to pool their resources for greater economy and effi- 
ciency in selling American manufactures beyond the seas. The co- 
operation of both exporters and importers is not only permitted but 
encouraged by European governments. Particularly in Germany, 
the mobilization of financial, manufacturing, transportation and dip- 
lomatic resources behind the German salesman pioneering in a 
foreign market, has been an accepted policy, and the tendency of 
other countries to a similar policy is one of the interesting develop- 

15 



ments of the war. In a report endorsing the Webb Bill which 
authorizes co-operation among exporters, the Committee on Co-oper- 
ation in Foreign Trade of the National Foreign Trade Council thus 
predicted an era of unprecedented competition in world markets after 
the war: 

"Europe's accustomed instrument for these activities will be co-operative 
effort beginning vi^ith cartels and trade associations of producers, manufac- 
turers, exporters and bankers, reinforced by the State, and, unless the discus- 
sions with which industrial Europe now vibrates shall fail, supplemented by 
economic alliances succeeding the war alliance now in force. The liberty 
which rivals and customers of American exporters have enjoyed to co-operate 
has produced highly organized selling organizations constituting the apex 
of a wedge forced by mobilized industrial, transportation and governmental 
resources into foreign markets. Continuation of the present conditions spells 
European industrial and governmental co-operation versus American com- 
pelled competition." 

The complete freedom of American exporters to combine to 
meet every exigency created by co-operation of their competitors and 
customers is, therefore, a necessary step in a national effort to retam 
and extend foreign trade in order that the labor employed and the 
capital invested in production for foreign markets shall not suffer. 

The recommendation of the First National Foreign Trade Con- 
vention is given greater point by the European Economic Alliances : 

"We urge Congress to take such action as will facilitate the development 
of American export trade by removing such disadvantages as may be now 
imposed by our anti-trust laws, to the end that American exporters, while 
selling the products of American workmen and American enterprise abroad, 
and in competition with other nations in the markets of the world, may be 
free to utilize all the advantages of co-operative action in copmg with com- 
binations of foreign rivals, united to resist American competition and com- 
binations of foreign buyers equipped to depress the prices of American 
goods." 

Resources of the Alliances 

Broadly speaking, the Ahied group consists of the United 
Kingdom, France, Belgium and Italy as manufacturing nations, Rus- 
sia and the British Colonies as producers of raw materials (not 
largely exporting manufactures), and the United Kingdom itself as 
the greatest shipping, banking and foreign-investing, as well as a 
great manufacturing ration. In the Central group Germany is 
predominantly a manufacturing country, but also a producer of 
certain vital raw materials, such as potash and dye stuffs, and is like- 
wise a first-class maritime power. Austria-Hungary supplements 
Germany's industry with large agricultural and natural resources. 

16 



It is inconceivable that either group will impose upon any great 
amount of competitive manufactured merchandise any restriction 
which will enhance the price to American consumers. More prob- 
ably they will resort to dumping. 

The following extracts from the resolutions indicate that it is in 
the domain of raw materials that the Allied group will seek an 
advantage : 

"The Allies declare themselves agreed to conserve for the Allied coun- 
tries, before all others, their natural resources during the whole period of 
commercial, industrial, agricultural and maritime reconstruction, and for this 
purpose they undertake to establish special arrangements to facilitate the 
interchange of those resources." 

The self-sufficiency of the Allied group is the logical goal of this 
agreement, precisely as British Imperial self-sufficiency was the goal 
of the Chamberlain policy which contemplated a United Kingdom 
tariff preference to colonial food stuffs and raw materials in return 
for a colonial preference to British manufactures. Leaving aside the 
problem whether the United Kingdom will consent to a tax on food, 
the question is whether such a policy, adopted by all the Allied group, 
would deprive the United States of any of its present outlet for 
foodstuffs or raw materials. The united colonial and Russian pro- 
duction of foodstuffs and raw materials was not equal to the ante- 
bellum necessities of the Allies. Would a preference stimulate pro- 
duction to the point of self-sufficiency? If the Allies were obliged 
still to depend partly on their own raw materials admitted to the con- 
suming Allied countries at a lower tariff rate than those of neutral 
or enemy origin, would not the price of both find a common level ? 
If so, where would lie the advantage? 

It should not be forgotten that the predominance of the British 
Empire in the trade of the world is largely due to the worldwide dis- 
tribution of the United Kingdom's sources of supply of raw ma- 
terials, which brings laden vessels from all parts of the world to the 
United Kingdom ready to carry back to the samfe or to other sources 
of supply British manufactures and coal. 



17 



EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN COMMER- 
CIAL POLICY, 1815-1915* 



The resolutions adopted by the so-called Economic Conference 
of the Allies in Paris represent a conscious return to mercantile 
ideas pf earlier centuries in an extreme form made possible only 
by the feeling aroused by the War. Despite the revival in the last 
four decades of the philosophy of trade known as "mercantilism," 
no one a few years ago would have believed that such an extreme 
application of its principles could in these days be consciously at- 
tempted by the responsible statesmen of the most advanced nations 
of Europe. In the Middle Ages, the commercial unit was the town, 
and each town felt its own welfare jeopardized by the welfare of any 
neighboring town. Trade was supposed to involve a conflict of inter- 
ests between rival municipalities, and all kinds of regulations were 
adopted by each town for the protection of its own citizens and 
also to hamper the free enterprise of the citizens of other towns. 
When the commercial unit widened from the town to the nation, a 
similar idea of international rivalry prevailed. The function of the 
statesman was supposed to be to increase the power and wealth of 
his own people at the expense of the power and wealth of other 
peoples. The object of such a policy was not primarily absolute 
wealth and comfort, but relative wealth and comfort in comparison 
with other nations. 

Commercial Power— Political Power 

Furthermore, the ideal of this period cannot be understood 
without recognizing the close connection which existed between 
the idea of commercial power and the idea of political power. The 
prestige and relative power of a nation among others was the goal. 
Commercial prosperity was considered the back-bone of the whole 
political power, and all political forces were in turn to be used to 
expand the commercial enterprise of the nation. At the end of the 
Fifteenth Century a popular rhymed pamphlet appeared m Eng- 
land, entitled "Libelle of Englishe Policye," which took as its motto 
the phrase: ''Anglia propter tuas latMS et naves, amina regna te 
salutare deherent—Englsind, on account of your sheep and your 

*This treatise on the evolution of European commercial policy was prepared 
by an exceptionally qualified American economist. 

18 



ships, all nations should salute you." The pamphlet goes on to 
lament the flourishing trade of the Dutch, Spaniards and others, and 
urges action on the part of the government which will drive such 
commerce from the seas and supplant it by English commerce in- 
stead. The method adopted throughout this long period included 
import duties and prohibitions, export duties and prohibitions, 
bounties on imports or exports, navigation laws, special treaties with 
other powers, all the arts of diplomacy, and finally wars for the es- 
tablishment of trade supremacy. 

In the early period, for instance, when the export of raw wool 
was the basis of England's power in foreign trade, bounties were 
granted on the export of this article. Later, as the woolen industry 
developed in England, and cloth became the chief export, the pro- 
hibition of wool export and a bounty on cloth followed. The jeal- 
ousy of Dutch commerce in the Seventeenth Century led to the 
Navigation Laws of 1651 under Cromwell and of 1662 under 
Charles Second, which were designed to destroy the carrying trade 
of the Dutch. However much the Puritan and the Stewart differed 
in other regards, they were united in this policy, which ultimately 
culminated in the war with Holland at the close of the century, and 
the destruction of Dutch supremacy on the sea. 

Throughout the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries the 
struggle continued, and the commercial rivalry for new trade routes, 
and new sources of supply and new markets, led to a succession of 
wars which culminated in the final great struggle between England 
and Napoleon. It was because he recognized that the great danger 
to his own power lay in England's control of the sea, and her pre- 
eminence in foreign trade, that Napoleon attempted to destroy this 
commercial domination by the Bedin and Milan Decrees, following 
the vigorous Orders in Council of the English Government, which 
aimed to destroy all trade with territories controlled by Napoleon. 

Adam Smith 

In the meantime, a new philosophy of trade had been advanced, 
and was rapidly winning a hearing among thoughtful business men 
and responsible statesmen. This was the new doctrine, formulated 
by Adam Smith, that the interests of nations in trade matters are 
not antagonistic but harmonious, and that the prosperity of each 
country will be. advanced by allowing the freest enterprise in 
others, and the freest intercourse between all nations. Such seed 
fell on fertile ground at the close of the Napoleonic Era, when the 

19 



nations were nearly exhausted by the struggles through which they 
had passed. It grew so rapidly in England, that the belief now pre- 
vailed among political economists, and business men as well, that a 
new truth applicable to all times and conditions had been discovered 
which was ultimately bound to prevail among all civilized nations. 
It was not, however, until 1846 that the English Corn Laws were 
finally repealed. In the previous years, the prohibition of the export 
of machinery had been removed, and it was not until 1849 that the 
restrictive navigation laws were repealed. The position of England 
at this time, as the workshop of the world, made it easy for English 
merchants and manufacturers to accept these principles, but the doc- 
trine was in the air, and the next thirty years represent the nearest 
approach to free trade in modern times, which the world has seen. 
The famous Cobden Treaty of 1860 between England and France 
was a landmark in this direction. It will be recalled that our own 
low tariff period was between 1846 and 1860. 

Effect of German Protectionism 

Toward the end of the '70s, a partial reaction toward protection- 
ism began. The lead was taken by Germany, with the beginning of 
her great industrial revival after the Franco-Prussian War. Most 
of the other great nations, except England, were influenced by the 
same movement. Gradually doubts began to arise all along the line 
as to the adequacy of the English theory in view of new trade and 
industrial rivalries which were beginning. As Germany, France 
and the United States became great manufacturing nations, com- 
peting with England, it no longer seemed so evident that the com- 
mercial relations of nations are always harmonious, rather than 
antagonistic. A Neo-Mercantilism arose, broader in spirit than 
that of earlier centuries, but based upon the principle that a national 
policy is necessary for the assistance or protection of one's own 
citizens in competition with the merchants or producers of other 
countries. The reason for this is to be found primarily in the 
enormous growth in population that had taken place in three-quar- 
ters of a century. This growth, in turn, of course, had obviously 
been the result of tremendous improvements in production, known 
as the Industrial Revolution. It became apparent that the world 
was no longer big enough for the indefinite expansion of all the 
rival races, and that the struggle for markets and for colonies, essen- 
tial to an indefinite increase of numbers, must involve a clash of 
political and commercial interests. It was natural that this n«w 

20 



philosophy should find its leaders in Germany, whose area was 
definitely circumscribed, while her population was increasing by 
leaps and bounds. It was not long, however, before it found strong 
expression in England, and the new ideas came to be adopted by a 
great party under the lead of Mr. Chamberlain. Even the Liberals, 
while holding strictly to the doctrine of free trade for England, 
and giving no encouragement to the idea of special tariff concessions 
to the colonies, were glad to have the colonies extend such prefer- 
ential rates to the Mother Country, and were quick to give up en- 
tirely their old colonial ideas. A part of the old free trade doctrine 
had been that the colonies were of no benefit to the Mother Country, 
and would naturally sever their political tie when strong enough 
to go it alone, and that this would be an advantage to all concerned. 
Such ideas have, indeed, gone completely by the board. The con- 
tinuance of England as a power of the first rank is now recognized 
by all parties to be bound up in the continuance of the empire as a 
political unit. This increase of imperialistic feeling is simply the 
British expression of the Neo-Mercantilism which has everywhere 
come to the front. 

In the meantime a very interesting development of ideas took 
place in Germany beginning with an address by Professor Olden- 
burg in 1897 and lasting to the outbreak. This took the form of a 
heated debate as to whether Germany should follow the road of 
England and become a purely commercial-industrial state, or 
whether for social and political reasons she should maintain her 
self-sufficiency in agricultural, mineral and forest resources even 
at the expense of higher prices. and some loss of expansion in foreign 
trade. The latter object demanded some interference with the 
natural course of trade, and higher protection to agriculture. This 
policy prevailed, and if it caused hardship in times of peace, it 
proved of vital importance when German foreign commerce was 
destroyed by war. 

Most-Favored-Nation Relation 

Despite this change in general philosophical attitude, the actual 
expression of it, so far as tariff or other regulations were concerned, 
has been surprisingly moderate. To be sure, there has been a ten- 
dency in Europe towards an increase of tariffs, both for the protec- 
tion of agriculture and for the protection of manufactures. On 
the other hand, the actual tariff rates for Europe as a whole have 
been determined mostly by the great net-work of commercial treaties 

21 



between the different countries. Especially noteworthy is the in- 
fluence of what has been called the European interpretation of the 
most-favored-nation clause. Most of these countries have treaties 
under which each must grant most- favored-nation treatment to the 
other, and this means that a reduction in duties granted to one coun- 
try is automatically extended to all other countries with whom 
such treaties exist. The result is that the lowest rate in any treaty 
becomes, with some exceptions, the rate extended to all countries. 
This interpretation has greatly modified the actual results of the 
protectionist reaction. Furthermore, there has been practically no 
effort to return to the earlier harsh measures of the navigation laws, 
and the like. It is in the light of these facts that the fundamental 
proposition of the Paris Conference that most-favored-nation treat- 
ment shall not be granted to the Central Powers after the War 
becomes so significant. 

Furthermore one of the recommendations for the period of re- 
construction after the war is for the exclusion of "Enemy Subjects" 
from "industries or professions which concern national defence or 
economic independence." Only recently it has been suggested in 
England that Germans be excluded from business in that country 
for a period of twenty years. The striking fact here is that the 
concept of "enemy nations" is not to cease with the termination of 
the war but is to continue indefinitely. Even in times of peace some 
nations are to be consciously recognized as the natural commercial 
enemies of others. Obviously this is not a mere extension of the 
movement which had started before the war, but a return to the 
fierce doctrine of innate hostility which characterized the fifteenth, 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the face of such an attitude 
it is futile to say, as some economists do, that this is simply a sub- 
stitution of passion for reason, a blind return to medievahsm. That 
the passionate feeling of the war is an essential element in the 
change was stated above, but the war and the sentiments it has 
evoked are realities &s much to be reckoned with as any so-called 
law of economics. It is commonly said that new conditions demand 
new policies. It is equally true that a return to old conditions 
means a revival of old policies. The conditions of international 
commercial rivalry of the twentieth century are more like those of 
the seventeenth than of the nineteenth century. Commercial power 
and political power again go hand in hand. No process of reason- 
ing will remove a people's pride in maintaining a place of honor and 
power in the world's affairs. And to-day the people of both beliig- 

22 



erent groups are convinced that their own prestige and importance, 
are threatened by the commercial predominance of their opponents. 
Under the influence of such sentiments extreme forms of expression 
and overweaning declarations of policy are inevitable. , Even if 
extreme they are a logical result. The stage is set and the drama 
develops relentlessly. If either side is convinced that its own im- 
mediate wealth or comfort is an inferior goal to the suppression of 
the prosperity of a rival, it no longer suffices to attack a policy on the 
mere ground of a temporary economic loss. Two questions natur- 
ally arise. The first is whether actually the spirit of hostility and the 
sense of national danger will survive,— that is, whether the political 
factor will outweigh the economic factor. The second is whether 
either the economic or the political interests of such diverse coun- 
tries as Russia, Japan, France and the British Empire will remain 
sufficiently united to stand the strain of such an extreme policy as 
that declared in Paris. Such questions, however, are for consid- 
eration elsewhere than in the section which aims merely to show the 
problem in its proper historical perspective. 



23 



PARIS CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS 



The United States Senate on June 29, 1916, adopted a resolu- 
tion requesting the President to transmit exact information as to 
"The precise character, form and full purpose" of the agreement 
reached at the Economic Conference of the Entente Allies. The 
President, on June 10, sent to the Senate the following report 
from the American Embassy at Paris to the Secretary of State : 

[No. 3311.] 

Paris, June 22, 1916. 

The Hon. Secretary of State, Washington. 

Sir: In confirmation of my telegram, No. 1449, of the 20th inst., I have 
the honor to inclose herewith, in copy and translation, the recommendations 
of the Economic Conference of the AlHes which sat in Paris on the 14th, 15th, 
16th and 17th of June, 1916, together with a list of the names of the delegates 
from the various countries represented. 

These recommendations apply to two separate periods— the period of the 
duration of the war and the period of reconstruction after the termination 

of hostilities. 

For the first period the recommendations have reference to measures 
for the prohibition of trade with the enemy countries and for the elimina- 
tion of the enemy firms in the allied countries. 

For the second period the measures adopted are designed to, give the 
allied countries a prior claim on their own natural resources and to prevent 
the dumping of merchandise of enemy manufacture or origm. 

The commission also recommended permanent economic measures for 
rendering the allied countries economically, industrially and agriculturally 
independent and for encouraging trade relations between the_ alhed countries 
by the improvement of shipping, telegraphic and postal facilities. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

Robert Woods Bliss, 
(For the Ambassador). 



# . [Translation.] 

ECONOMIC CONFERENCE OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. 

The representatives of the allied Governments have met in Paris, Mr. 
Clementel, Minister of Commerce, presiding, on the 14th, 15th, 16th and 
17th of June, 1916, for the purpose of fulfiUing the mandate which was 
confided to them by the conference of Paris on March 28, 1916, to put mto 
practice their solidarity of views and interests and to propose to their respec- 
tive Governments suitable measures for realizing this solidarity. 

They perceive that the central powers of Europe, after having imposed 
upon them their military struggle" in spite of all their efforts to avoid the con- 

24 



flict, are preparing today, in concert with their allies, a struggle in the eco- 
nomical domain which will not only survive the re-establishment of peace, but 
at that very moment will assume all its amplitude and all its intensity. 

They cannot in consequence conceal from themselves that the agreement 
which is being prepared for this purpose amongst their enemies has for its 
evident object the establishment of their domination over the production and 
the markets of the whole world and to impose upon the other countries ari 
inacceptable hegemony. 

In the face of such a grave danger the representatives of the allied Gov- 
ernments consider that it is their duty, on the grounds of necessary and legit- 
imate defense, to take and realize from now onward all the measures requi- 
site on the one hand to secure for themselves and the whole of the markets 
of neutral countries full economic independence and respect for sound com- 
mercial practice, and on the other to facilitate the organization on a perma- 
nent basis of this economic alliance. For this purpose the representatives of 
the allied Governments have decided to submit for the approval of their Gov- 
ernments the following resolutions : 

A 

Measures for War Period 

I 

Laws and regulations prohibiting trading with the enemy shall be brought 
into accord for this purpose : 

A. The allies will prohibit their own subjects and citizens and all per- 
sons residing in their territories from carrying on any trade with the inhab- 
itants of enemy countries of whatever nationality, or with enemy subjects, 
wherever resident, persons, firms and companies whose business is controlled 
wholly or partially by enemy subjects or subject to enemy influence, whose 
names will be included in a special list. 

B. The allies will also prohibit importation into their territories of all 
goods originating or coming from enemy countries. 

^ C. The allies will further devise means of establishing a system of en- 
abling contracts entered into with enemy subjects and injurious to national 
interests to be canceled unconditionally. 

II 

Business undertakings, owned or operated by enemy subjects in the ter- 
ritories of the allies, are all to be sequestrated or placed under control. 
Measures will be taken for the purpose of winding up some of these under- 
takings and realizing the assets, the proceeds of such realizations remaining 
sequestrated or under control. In addition, by export prohibitions, which are 
necessitated by the internal situation of each of the allied countries, the 
allies will complete the measures already taken for the restriction of enemy 
suppHes both in the mother countries and the dominions, colonies and pro- 
tectorates : 

1. By unifying lists of contraband and export prohibition, particularly by 
prohibiting the export of all commodities declared absolute or conditional 
contraband. 

2. By making the grant of licenses to export to neutral countries, from 

25 



which export to the enemy territories might take place, conditional upon the 
existence in such countries of control organizations approved by the allies, 
or in the absence of such organizations, upon special guaranties, such as the 
limitation of the quantities to be exported, and supervision by allied consular 

officers, etc. 

B 

Transitory Measures for the Period of the Commercial, Industrial, 
Agricxiltural and Maritime Reconstruction of the Allied Countries 

I 

The allies declare their common determination to insure the re-establish- 
ment of the countries suffering from acts of destruction, spoHation and unjust 
requisition, and they decide to join in devising means to secure the restora- 
tion to those countries, as a prior claim, of their raw materials — industrials, 
agricultural plant and stock— and mercantile fleet, of to assist them to re- 
equip themselves in these respects. 

II 

Whereas the war has put an end to all treaties of commerce between 
the allies and enemy powers, and it is of essential importance that during the 
period of economic reconstruction the liberty of none of the alhes should be 
hampered by any claim put forward by enemy powers to most-favored-nation 
treatment, the allies agree that the benefit of this treatment will not be granted 
to those powers during a number of years to be fixed by mutual agreement 
among themselves. 

During this number of 3fears the allies undertake to assure each other, 
so far as possible, compensatory outlets for trade in case consequences detri- 
mental to their commerce should result from the application of the under- 
taking referred to in the preceding clause. 

Ill 

The allies declare themselves agreed to conserve for the allied countries, 
before all others, their natural resources during the whole period of commer- 
cial, industrial, agricultural and maritime reconstruction, and for this. purpose 
they undertake to establish special arrangements to faciUtate the interchange 
of these resources. 

IV 

In order to defend their commerce and industry and their agriculture 
and navigation against economic aggression resulting from dumping or any 
other mode of unfair, competition the allies decide to fix by agreement a 
period of time during which commerce with the enemy powers will be sub- 
mitted to special treatment, and goods originating from their countries will 
be subjected either to prohibitions or to a special regime of an effective char- 
acter. The allies will determine by agreement, through diplomatic channels, 
the special conditions to be imposed during the above-mentioned period on 
the ships of enemy powers. 

V 

The alHes will devise measures, to be taken jointly or severally, for pre- 
venting enemy subjects from exercising in their territories certain industries 
or professions which concern national defense or economic independence. , 

26 



c 

Pesmanent Measures of Mutual Assistance and Collaboration Among 

THE Allies 

I 

The allies decide to take the necessary steps without delay to render them- 
selves independent of enemy countries in so far as regards raw materials and 
manufactured articles essential to the normal development of their economic 
activities. These measures will be directed to assuring the independence of 
thealhes, not only so far as concerns sources of supply, but also as regards 
their financial, commercial and maritime organization. The allies will adopt 
such measures as seem to them most suitable for the carrying out of this 
resolution according to the nature of the commodities and having regard to 
the principles which govern their economic policy. They may, for example, 
have recourse to either enterprises subsidized and directed or' controlled by 
the governments themselves or to the grant of financial assistance for the 
encouragement of scientific and technical research and the development of 
national industries and resources, or to customs duties or prohibitions of a 
temporary or permanent character, or to a combination of these different 
methods. 

Whatever may be the methods adopted, the object aimed at by the allies 
is to increase the production within their territories, as a whole, to a suffi- 
cient extent to enable them to maintain and develop their economic position 
and independence in relation to enemy countries. 

II 

In order to permit the interchange of their products the allies undertake 
to adopt measures faciHtating mutual trade relations, both by the establish- 
ment of direct and rapid land and sea transport services at low rates and 
by the extension and improvement of postal, telegraphic and other communi- 
cations. 

Ill 

The allies undertake to convene a meeting of technical delegates to draw 
up measures for the assimilation, so far as may be possible, of their laws gov- 
erning patents, indications of origin, and trademarks. In regard to patents, 
trademarks, literary and artistic copyright which come into existence during 
the war in enemy countries, the allies will adopt, so far as possible, an iden- 
tical procedure to be applied as soon as hostilities cease. This procedure 
will be elaborated by the technical delegates of the allies. 

D 

Whereas, for the purpose of their common defense against the enemy, 
the allied powers have agreed to adopt a common economic policy on the lines 
laid down in the resolutions which have been passed; and whereas, it is rec- 
ognized that the effectiveness of this policy depends absolutely upon these 
resolutions being put into operation forthwith, the representatives of the allied 
Governments undertake to recommend that their respective Governments 
shall take, without delay, all the measures, whether temporary or permanent, 
requisite to giving full and complete effect to this policy forthwith and to 

27 



communicate to each other the decisions arrived at to attain the object. 
Paris, June 17, 1916. 

Have signed these resolutions : 

For France; M. E. Clementel, Secretary of Commerce and In- 
dustry; M. G. Doumergue, Secretary of the Colonies; M. M. 
Sembat, Secretary of Public Works ; M. A. Metin, Secretary 
of Labor and Social Progress; M. J. Thierry, Under-Secre- 
tary of State of War (Administrative Service) ; M. L. Nail, 
Under-Secretary of State of the Navy (Mercantile Marine) ; 
M. J. Cambon, French Ambassador, General Secretary of 
the Board of Foreign Afifairs ; M. A. Masse, General Secre- 
tary of the Board of Agriculture; M, J. Branet, General 
Director of Customs; M. P. de Margerie, Minister pleni- 
potentiary. Director of the Political and Commercial De- 
partment in the Board of Foreign Affairs. 

For Belgium : M. de Broqueville, Chairman of the Council, 
Secretary of War; Baron Beyens, Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs; M. van de Vyvere, Secretary of Finances; Count 
Goblet d'AIviella, Member of the Ministerial Council. 

For Italy: His Excellency M. Tittoni, Italian Ambassador in 
Paris; M. Daneo, Secretary of Finances. 

For Japan : Baron Sakatani, former Secretary of Finances. 

For Portugal: Dr. Alfonso Costa, Secretary of Finances; Dr. 
Augusto Soares, Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 

For Russia: M. Pokrowsky, Imperial Counsellor, Privy Coun- 
cillor; M. Prilejaieff, attached to the Board of Trade and 
Industry, Privy Councillor. 

For Servia : M. Marinkovitch, Secretary of Commerce. 

The following persons, who are diplomatic representatives of the allied 
countries in Paris, have been appointed as a permanent committee of the 
economic conference : 

Belgium 

M. G. Peltzer, vice-president of the Union Economique Beige, 

France 

M. Denys Cochin, Minister of State, president of the committee; M. Gout, 
Minister Plenipotentiary, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office; Contre 
Admiral Amet, vice-president of the committee. 

Italy 

Prince Ruspoli, Minister Plenipotentiary, Italian Embassy in Paris ; Com- 
mander del Abbadessa, Assistant General Director of the Customs; Col. 
Brancaccio. 

Japan 

Tatsuke, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in Paris. 

Great Britain 

Earl Granville, Counsellor of the -British Embassy in Paris. 

28 



Portugal 
M. de Vilhena. 

Russia 
Sevastopoulo, Counsellor of the Russian Embassy in Paris; Batcheff, 
Commercial Attache at the Russian Embassy in Paris. 

Servia 
Voulovitch, deputy; Kapetanovitch, deputy. 
General Secretary: Bosseront d'Anglade, Minister Plenipotentiary. 

Interpretation by French Minister of Commerce 

M. Clementel, President of the Conference, thus explained the 
resolutions : 

"Dumping is the favorite weapon of the Germans for acquiring 
commercial supremacy. It consists on the whole of measures af- 
fording bonuses for exportation, direct or otherwise; for selling 
inland at a higher rate than abroad, etc., with a view to ruining 
foreign industries. 

"The Conference of Paris has provided for thwarting this pol- 
icy; if the war took us by surprise, we do not intend that peace 
should do so, too. The Allies are the strongest from an economic 
point of view. They represent a population of nearly 400 millions, 
and dispose of the greater part of all raw materials; nickel and 
platina ores, aluminum (bauxite) are entirely in the Allies' hands, 
and 84 per cent, of manganese. As regards hemp, the Allies' pro- 
duction is four and a half times larger than the enemy's ; as to flax, 
the Allies hold four-fifths of the world's production; with regard to 
wool, their supply is eleven times greater than that of the adver- 
saries ; in silk, eight times greater ; they have the monopoly of jute, 
and if the neutrals share to a great extent in the production of cotton 
with the Allies, their adversaries are short of this commodity. ' 

"The economic superiority of the Allies is obvious. To insure 
it, there never was any question at the Conference of adopting a 
customs policy for all; each ally will remain wholly independent. 
Each product will be the subject of separate negotiations between 
the countries interested in the matter, and an infinite variety of com- 
binations may be made, 

"Another principle of the Allied governments in the war of 
legitimate economic defense that they are working to wage is : not to 
attack anyone. The neutral nations have nothing to fear; we are 
working to free them. The destruction of German economic over- 
lordship means the suppression of a danger that threatens them. 

29 



"By increasing the productive forces of the AlHed countries, we 
render them better able than in the past to check the attempts at 
oppression which one nation might in the future again be guilty of, 
and by so doing we are working for the assurance of peace. 

"Everyone knows how Article IX of the Treaty of Frankfort 
has become a powerful economic weapon in the hands of the Ger- 
mans, thanks to its specializations permitting them to disregard it 
when its observance would have proved a drawback. The same 
clause will not occur again. The Allies are fully agreed upon this 
point, even Russia and Italy, with whom the Germans had fondly 
hoped to maintain their privileged situation ; and this shows to what 
extent nations desire to be freed from the economic domination that 
was weighing upon them. 

"The free disposal of raw materials is an essential factor in the 
economic power of a nation. Germany had in her possession foreign 
ores, and these she converted upon her own territory. This was the 
case with Australian zinc, aluminum from Provence, asbestos from 
Russia or Scotland. The Allies are now determined not to leave 
these articles, so essential to the prosperity of a nation, to others. 
Mr. Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia, told me that not a 
grain of zinc ore should leave his country for Germany even if the 
latter should order double the quantity in the future to what she 
purchased there in the past. 

"The Allies have considered the measure to be adopted in order 
to save their industries and manufactures from suffering through 
the business methods practiced by the German Empires— especially 
dumping. They have undertaken to subject, during a certain lapse 
of time which is to be .fixed among themselves, all goods originating 
from enemy countries, to certain prohibitions or special regulations, 
thus enabling them to cope in an efficacious manner with any at- 
tempts at dumping. The fact that at the present time Germany is 
constituting, upon her own territory, large supplies of goods, mostly 
manufactured with raw materials from the invaded regions, makes 
this agreement all the more necessary. It would be an unheard of 
thing for the Germanic Empires, immediately after the war, to be 
able to raise their rate of exchange by selling to the Allies goods 
manufactured from raw materials which were their (the Allies') 
own special property." 

Participation of British Colonies 

From the standpoint of future joint-policy by the Allies, the 
participation of Mr. W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, 

30 



and Sir George Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce of Canada, 
was significant. British contribution to any policy designed to eman- 
cipate the Allies from dependence upon enemy countries for raw 
materials necessarily involves the self-governing dominions of the 
British Empire which control their own fiscal and tariff policies 
and whose legislative acquiescence will be necessary to any scheme 
of Imperial or Ally tariff preferences, restrictions of export of raw 
materials or navigation discriminations. 

Prior to the Conference Mr. Asquith, British Prime Minister, 
declared that the British representatives would have no power to 
commit the Government, and presumably the Colonial representa- 
tives were similarly limited. On July 12th, Mr. Asquith announced 
m the House of Commons at London that the British Government 
had approved the resolutions. 

Mr. Asquith's Explanation 

In the House of Commons on August 2, Mr. Asquith said : 
"There are two important points to which I would like to draw 
attention. The first is the declaration of the common determination 
of the Allies to obtain reparation for the countries occupied by the 
enemy. From that determination the Allies have not swerved, and 
in these resolutions they reaffirm it. The second is that these reso- 
lutions are in no sense aimed at neutrals. Our attention has been 
called to the fact that some uneasiness appears to have arisen in neu- 
tral countries, more especially in the United States of America, with 
regard to the resolutions of the conference, and there seems to be a 
feeling— I don't say it is widespread— that the resolutions might be 
directed at, or aimed against, neutral countries which would undergo 
novel and undue restrictions in the various countries whose repre- 
sentatives signed the resolutions. That is not the case. The resolu- 
tions contemplate only necessary measures of self-defense against 
economic aggression threatening the Allies' most vital interests, and 
in carrying them into practical effect, I need hardly say that every 
endeavor will be made to insure that neutrals will not suffer." 

In the same debate Sir J. Simon was thus quoted by the London 
press : 

"He warned the House of the risk of the center of the world's 
trade passing from this country to America, and nothing they could 
do would affect trade between America and Germany. If they 
diverted the natural course of trade, they would throw the Central 
Powers into the hands of the immensely powerful American com- 

31 



mercial interests. They ought, immediately the war was over, to do 
everything they could to restore London to the position of pre- 
eminence it had before the war as a center of exchange. The lesson 
to be learned from the war in the fiscal sphere was that direct and 
intended interference with trade was nothing like as important as the 
indirect and unintended, uncalculated, and it might be incalculable 
effects upon British trade which government interference might 
produce." 

A Colonial Expectation 

Sir George Foster, Canadian Minister of Commerce, outlined 
a colonial view before the Royal Colonial Institute at London on 

June 28: 

"He did not hold out the least hope in the world," accordmg to 
the London Morning Post, "that the empire could be brought 
together on the basis of Free Trade. As regards our trade and 
commerce and our production it was essential that we should get 
together as soon as possible and hammer out a policy for the future. 
Let the Empire treat itself and its partners a little more favorably 
than it treated those who did not belong to its family, and let us 
say to others : 'We will not be unreasonable with you, but we will be 
just to our own.' When the war was over the nations that had 
banded themselves together in defence of the ideals for which they 
were fighting should have the duty of reconstructmg the basis of 
their attitude towards each other so that their treatment of one 
another should be more favorable than that accorded to neutrals." 

Lord Bryce's View 

Addressing the Congregational Union at Birmingham, Eng- 
land, on October 3rd, Viscount Bryce, former British Ambassador to 

the United States, said : 

"The talk we now hear about starting, after peace has been 
concluded, a new war of trade to follow the war of arms has im- 
mense capacities for mischief. Such a trade war would prolong, 
would embitter afresh, those hatreds that ought to be allowed to die ; 
and it assumes a continuance of those very^things from which we 
expect our victory to deliver us once for all." 

Statement of Minister of War Trade 

A cable dispatch to the Associated Press, dated London, Octo- 

The comment in the United States concerning the possible effect of the 
commercial measures contemplated by the recent Paris Economic Conference 

32 



of the Entente Allies led Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of War Trade, to 
declare today that wholly wrong conclusions had been drawn from them and 
especially with regard to those conclusions attributing any attempt to exclude 
or discriminate against the trade of the United States vvith the Entente Allies 
after the war. 

"Our relations with the New World will always be of vast importance 
to us," Lord Robert said to the Associated Press today, "and they take a 
leading place in our plans. In answer to the great calumny so often circu- 
lated, and which we indignantly repudiate, I want to say that while we are 
planning our measures for peace now, we pledge our honor that these plans 
and measures, which we are bound to take against the neutral trader with our 
enemies under the laws of war, have been and will be kept entirely separate. 

"They are worked out in different departments. They are wholly distinct. 
We shall never try, what we know would be fatal to our own interests, to 
use any of our belligerent measures to enable us to replace neutral by British 
trade or stifle or impede the commercial enterprise of neutral nations." 

Lord Robert did not mention the blacklist in this connection, but unques- 
tionably he had it in mind. 

"What one of the districts devastated during the war would wish to lose 
the opportunity to take advantage of American enterprise and capital?" asked 
Lord Robert. "Suppose, for instance, no question of friendship were involved. 
Then it resolves itself into a question of plain common sense business," he 
added. 

Articles in American newspapers which had been called to his attention, 
said Lord Robert, seemed to take the ground that if the Paris measures were 
carried out they would discriminate against all non-Entente allied trade, and 
would either force the United States into preferential trade relations with 
Germany or into trouble with Great Britain. 

"All these forecasts," said the Minister of War Trade, "are examples of 
the inveterate tendency to draw curious implications out of perfectly simple 
provisions. The provision as to the preservation of neutral resources during 
the period of reconstruction amounts to a provision that those among the 
Allies who have suffered worst from the war will have the first call on the 
resources of those who are richest and have suffered least. In practice this 
means that Belgium, northern France, Poland and Serbia will have the first 
call on British capital, which has been the main financial strength of the 
Allies and provided many of them with arms, ammunition and food, and 
which shall continue to be at their disposal in the work of reconstruction. 

"And yet Americans who have been disposed in the past to question the 
efforts of Great Britain in this war actually now throw this pledge which 
she has given her allies in her teeth. The same kind of considerations apply 
in the case of the permanent proposal concerning the reciprocal' exchange of 
products after the war. The measures here proposed are those which every 
nation in the world, except this country, has employed for j'ears to protect 
its com_merce. We have been alone, having neither a protective tariff nor a 
system of subsidies. Yet now we find ourselves criticised by others who 
always have employed tariff and other devices to stimulate their trade, as 

33 



if there were some strange departure when we propose to help our allies 
increase the rewards of labor in this and allied countries after the war. 

"We have passed through greater straits during the last two years than 
any other country before in modern history. We have tremendous problems 
to meet. Of course, we are planning to meet them. Of course, we are going 
to use Government aid in helping to meet them. Of course, we are going to 
do what every other nation always has done. Those who try to spin sus- 
picions out of a situation so simple surely are not facing business facts in a 
business spirit." 

Lord Robert said he was convinced that some ideas had grown up in the 
United States regarding the Paris Conference which had been deliberately 
fostered by the Germans, who would like to have an exclusive trade agree- 
ment with the United States and "in which case they would be in a much 
happier position than at present." 



34 



CARRYING THE RESOLUTIONS INTO 

EFFECT 



British Committee on Paris Resolutions 

On July 18, 1916, was announced the appointment by the Prime 
Minister of the following committee tO' consider the recommenda- 
tions of the Paris Conference : 

Messrs. Arthur Balfour, Chairman. Frederick H. Smith, Bart. 

H. Gosling. G. J. Wardle, M.P. 

W. A. S. Hewins, M.P. H. Birchenough, K.C.M.G. 

A. H. Illingworth, M.P. Lord Faringdon. 

T. P. Maclay, Bart. SirC. G. Hyde. 

A. Mond, Bart., M.P. Sir C. A. Parsons, K.C.B., F.R.S 

Arthur Pease. Lord Rhondda. 

R. E. Prothero, M.P. ■ G. Scoby-Smith 

The Committee will, it was officially stated, determine : 

a. What industries are essential to the future safety of the 

nation, and what steps should be taken to maintain 
or establish them. 

b. What steps should be taken to recover home and foreign 

trade lost during the war, and to secure new 
markets. 

c. To what extent and by what means the resources of the 

Empire should and can be developed. 

d. To what extent and by what means the sources of sup- 

ply within the Empire can be prevented from 
falling under foreign control. 

High political, business and economic ability was drawn to this 
committee which contains both Free Traders and Tariff Reformer. 
Of it the Evening Standard said : 

"Lord Balfour of Burleigh, who has had much experience as 
chairman of commissions, is one of the best-known Unionist Free 
Traders. Some years ago he was Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Board of Trade. Mr. Arthur Balfour is the well-known ex-Master 

35 



Cutler of Sheffield; Mr. Gosling is a member of the Port of London 
Authority, with special knowledge of Labor questions ; Mr. Hewins, 
Unionist M. P. for Hereford, is an authority on economics, and sec- 
retary of the Tariff Commission; Mr. Illingworth, Liberal M. P. for 
the Haywood Division of Lancashire, is a prominent Bradford busi- 
ness man. 

"Sir Joseph Maclay is a Glasgow shipowner ; Sir Alfred Mond 
is managing director of Brunner, Mond & Co. (Limited), and other 
companies, and treasurer of the Free Trade Union ; Mr. Pease is a 
Northern colliery owner ; Mr. Prothero, Unionist M. P. for Oxford 
University, is the well-known authority on agriculture and food 
supply ; Sir F. H. Smith is an india rubber and cotton manufacturer 
and colliery director in North Wales, and Mr. Wardle is Labor mem- 
ber for Stockport. 

"Sir Henry Birchenough is a director of the British South 
Africa Company, and served on the Commission on Shipping Rings ; 
Lord Faringdon (formerly Sir Alexander Henderson) is chairman 
of the Great Central Railway, and became a member of the Tarifif 
Commission in 1904; Sir Clarendon Hyde, formerly Liberal M. P. 
for Wednesbury, is chairman of the Cannock Chase Minimum Wage 
Board and a partner in the firm of S. Pearson & Son (contractors) ; 
Sir Charles Parsons developed the steam turbine, and is chairman of 
the Parsons Marine Steam Turbine Company ; Lord Rhondda, one 
of the New Year peers, is still better known as Mr. D. A. Thomas, 
managing director of the Cambrian Colliery Combine." 

British Colonial Conference 

Premier Asquith in the House of Commons on July 24, said : 

"The Government desires as soon as possible to convene a con- 
ference of the representatives of the United Kingdom and the 
dominions and India to consider the commercial policy to be adopted 
after the war. 

"In view of the past fiscal controversies in this country, we think 
it essential as a prior stage, in order that the conference may have 
practical results, to set up a committee here to discover how far an 
agreement among ourselves is possible under the changed condi- 
tions brought about by the war. 

"The appointment of this committee will not interfere in any 
way with a free and unfettered discussion of the problems with the 
overseas representatives." 

36 



Subsidy for Anglo-Italian Trade 

In the light of the Paris resolutions the following news despatch 
is of interest : 

London, Tuesday. The government will ask Parliament to 
sanction a state subsidy of £50,000 (about $250,000) yearly for a 
decade to the newly formed British and Italian Trading Corporation. 
Reginald McKenna, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced this in 
the House of Commons. The corporation, which has a capital of 
£1,000,000, subscribed privately by banks, is for the purpose of assist- 
ing trade and commerce between Great Britain and Italy. 

The Russo-Japanese Alliance 

The Journal of the American Asiatic Association for October, 
1916, gives the following text of the treaty signed between Russia 
and Japan on July 3rd : 

"The Imperial Government of Japan and the Imperial Government of 
Russia resolve to continue their efforts for the maintenance of a lasting peace 
in the Far East, and have agreed upon the following : 

Article 1. Japan vi^ill not be a party to any political arrangement or 
combination contracted against Russia. Russia will not be a party to any 
political arrangement or combination directed against Japan. 

Article 2. In the event of the territorial rights or special interests in the 
Far East of one of the contracting parties recognized by the other contract- 
ing party being threatened, Japan and Russia will consult with each other 
on the measures to be taken with a view to support and co-operation being 
given to one another for the safeguarding and defence of those rights and 
interests." 

The Journal adds : 

"The new Convention is the natural outcome of the past relations be- 
tween the Governments which have borne evidence of increasing and steady 
growth of the rapprochement between former enemies. In July, 1909, 
within two years of the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, a political 
entente was concluded in which the two Governments, desiring to consolidate 
the peace and good relations established by the Portsmouth treaty, entered 
into an agreement with a view of removing all future misunderstanding, to 
respect the territorial integrity of each other and all the rights arising from 
agreements between themselves as well as their conventions with China. 

"Three years later this was followed by a second agreement, destined to 
develop the effect of the first convention. The two Governments agreed to 
mutually co-operate in the improvement of railways in Manchuria and of 
their connecting services, and to abstain from harmful competition. They 
agreed to maintain the status quo in Manchuria resulting from existing 
treaties not only between the two contracting parties, but also between the 
latter and China. They further pledged themselves in the event of the 
status quo being menaced jointly to concert measures for its maintenance. 
****** Subsequently an understanding was arrived at between 
Tokio and Petrograd concerning their respective interests in the region of 
Mongolia contiguous to Manchuria. This treaty has never been published 
although its conclusion is an open secret." 

37 



ECONOMIC ALLIANCE OF CENTRAL 

POWERS 



The idea of a Central European commercial union between 
Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey is discussed in the German 
press, but no record of official action corresponding to that taken 
by the Entente Allies is to be found in the European press. 

Friederich Naumann, a German social reformer, political leader 
and member of the Reichstag, in his book, "Mittel Europa," pub- 
lished and apparently written since the outbreak of the European 
war, lays down certain principles as a basis for Central European 
union or economic alliance. While other advocates have treated this 
as a new economic policy, he views the necessity as a logical conse- 
quence of the Franco-Prussian war, holding that the economic and 
political frontier of Central Europe was turned against France at 
that time, and the Eastern frontier established as a result of the 
Berlin Congress of 1878 and the Austria-Hungarian Alliance of 
1879. He finds that Germans, Magyars, Poles, Bohemians and the 
other races in Germany and Austria-Hungary have not yet formed a 
national type, and that Central Europe therefore is still lacking 
development as a national unit. 

He attributes Germany's economic isolation to the fact that the 
development of German commercial and industrial life, with its 
accompanying desire for group activity is strange to countries where 
individual effort and liberty of the individual is still regarded as the 
desirable aim of life. This German sentiment, Naumann holds, has 
entered Austria-Hungary, the economic life of which, he believes, is 
of German origin, but he finds that Austria-Hungary has not fully 
realized the German economic idea, that thousands of Austrians 
normally emigrate every year, and that the splendid farm lands of 
Hungary still produce on the average of only one-half as much 
wheat per acre as Germany, although Germany obtains better results 
with less labor. 

Naumann's idea is that the industrial and trade associations of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary should be combined so that new 
Central-European associations will take their- place, and better use 
be made of the economic forces on both sides. Closer co-operation 
of cartels, insurance companies, banks, etc., is to support this need. 

38 



The war, Naiimann explains, has brought to Germany and to Aus- 
tria-Hungary a new conception of economy, scientific socialism mak- 
ing great progress, and the individual right of possession sustaining 
considerable encroachments, until it is now certain that the ante- 
bellum condition will not be re-established. Municipal corporations, 
governmental syndicates and governmental price control have en- 
tered the economic life of Germany, and the solution of the problems 
created, in Naumann's opinion, may be found in the extension of the 
government syiidicate combined with labor insurance. 

He points out that the government has taken hold temporarily, 
and possibly permanently, of the collection jmd distribution of food, 
all of which will have an influence upon economic relations with 
Austria-Hungary. Increased economic activity alone will make it 
possible for Austria-Hungary, according to Naumann, to overcome 
its financial difficulties. He admits that an economic union between 
the two countries, while feasible, is not altogether self contained, 
and that larger fields for economic exploitation will be necessary to 
make it so ; but even if those fields cannot be extended, Germany and 
Austria-Hungary and Turkey, whose inclusion appears to him to be 
desirable, might well form a powerful economic union in the centre 
of Europe. 

He writes : 'Tt lacks cotton, wool, cereals and animal food- 
stuffs, copper, iron ore, leather, coffee, rice, tobacco, wood, corn, 
jute, mineral oil and chemicals. It lacks more than is wanting to the 
British Empire and to North America, and it has not the quantity 
possibilities of Russia, but there is no economic unit in existence hav- 
ing no need for supplementary supplies, and we can collect as much 
as we need and store it. A population owning such stocks of coal, 
steel machines, enable to work as we do, would be able also to buy, 
to save and to economize." 

The establishment of free trade between Germany and Austria- 
Hungary is the first necessary step, in the policy of Naumann, 
towards the realization of such an economic alliance, to be followed 
by a joint policy with regard to traffic, uniformity in taxation, which 
should lead to a common policy in international finance. The disin- 
clination of Hungary for such a step, which might mean to the 
Magyar the surrender of part of the national independence of Hun- 
gary, is acknowledged, and Naumann does not believe that the politi- 
cal realization of the Central Europe idea will immediately solve the 
economic problem ; but rather that a "Mittel-Europa" will grow eco- 
nomically out of the political formation. 

39 



Franz Koehler, in a book entitled "The New Triple Alliance," 
wrote : 

"It will be the principal aim of this combination to regulate 
offer and demand between the individual countries according to 
their mutual interests and needs. So, for instance, the demand for 
breadstuffs satisfied until now by Russian and American imports, 
will have to be filled by the newly acquired Eastern countries and 
also by Turkey. This will lead principally to a reguladon of the- im- 
ports from the individual states which will have to be suited to the 
demand of the others. Egypt and Turkey are the only countries 
in this combination of states producing cotton.* Copper will be 
found in future to some extent in Servia and still more in Turkey. 
Besides copper, Turkey also will be able to supply paraffin in suffi- 
cient quantity to make the new combination independent of 
foreign supplies." 

It is also contemplated by those who support such a scheme to 
turn Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria into an 
economic unit, self-containing, and self-supporting, independent 
from the other countries. 

A conference of leading commercial Associations of Germany 
interested in the foundation of a Central European Zollverein was 
held in Munich. The London Times Trade Supplement of July, 
1916, says: 

"Some fairly outspoken views on behalf of the three nations 
involved came out at Munich, where a joint conference was recently 
held of the leading commercial associations. Germany was upheld 
by 460 representatives, Austria by 100, and Hungary by 40. 

Austro-Hungarian Views 

"Dr. Gustav Stolper (Vienna) insisted that any commercial 
union of the Central Empires should be accompanied by a strong 
political union, in view of the financial burden to be borne and the 
prime necessity of ensuring supplies of raw materials. For both 
these reasons a speedy resumption of international trade relations 
was, in his opinion, imperative. 

"Hungary's watchfulness over her agrarian interests was voiced 
by Dr. Gratz, of Budapest, who stipulated that each member of the 
Union should undertake to fill its requirements in raw materials — 

• Practically all German comment dates back several months and was based 
on the German hope then entertained of a return of Egypt to Turkey. 

40 



particularly agricultural — from within the Union. He alluded to 
the damage done to Hungarian trade in agricultural produce by- 
German import duties. If this protection were fully maintained 
against outsiders, he looked forward to great developments. 

"A more despondent note was struck by Professor Herkner, 

of Berlin. He recognized the serious financial straits Germany 

would be in after the war through the need for importing far more 

goods than it would for a long time be in a position to export. He 

"said : 

" *A system of interdependence between ourselves and our 
allies is impossible. A growth of one and a half milliard marks in 
trade within the Union would not free us from the necessity for 
regaining international custom amounting to eight and a half mil- 
liards. Furthermore, merely to win this back would not suffice to 
ease the financial burden left by the war. . . . There is no doubt 
that we must place the fruits of our industry in ever-increasing 
volume on the world's markets, and our allies will need to do the 
same. The idea of a self-sufficient Central European Union is 
fallacious.' " , i 



41 



SCANDINAVIAN ECONOMIC CON- 
. FERENCE 

The effect of the war upon the commerce and other interests of 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark has lead to a pohtical and economic 
grouping of significant interest to all neutrals because it is the near- 
est approach to an alliance among nations not involved in, but 
affected by the war, and its supporters have, at least informally, 
invited the collaboration of the United States. At the initiative of 
King Gustav of Sweden, a conference of the three powers was held 
at Copenhagen on March 9th, 1916, and later the Prime Minister of 
Norway, answering an inquiry in Parliament, said : 

"Every eflfort should be made to safeguard the independence of the Scan- 
dinavian countries in the economic struggle which will follow the war." 

Further exchanges were followed by another conference at 
Christiania, Norway, beginning September 20th and attended by Mr. 
Zahle, Prime Minister, and Mr. Eric Scavenius, Foreign Minister, 
of Denmark; Prime Minister Hammarsksjoeld and Foreign Minister 
Wallenberg of Sweden ; Prime Minister Gunnar Knudsen and For- 
eign Minister Ihlen of Norway. A special cable despatch to the 
New York Times of September 24th summarized the proceedings of 
the conference : 

"The three countries are unanimous in their desire to maintain a loyal 
and impartial neutrality during the present war. The injuries to the rights 
and interests of neutrals inflicted by the belligerent powers, as well as the 
difficulties in the matter of commercial policies as affecting neutrals, were 
examined at great length. This examination resulted in an agreement to 
establish a more extensive collaboration among the three countries. 

"Particular attention was devoted to the destruction or detention of 
neutral ships and neutral cargoes as well as the effects of the blacklists of 
the belligerent nations. In this connection it was agreed that with a view to 
facilitating the commercial policy of the three countries they should be kept 
informed by each other, either through the governments themselves or by 
competent authorities, regarding the measures which should be taken either 
relating to the question of this policy or to the suppression of commercial 
espionage in the respective countries in order to safeguard the combined 
commercial interests of the three nations. It was also agreed that after the 
war it would be necessary for the three Scandinavian nations to take meas- 
ures for their continued collaboration. 

"Another question which has been taken up for discussion at'the confer- 
ence is that of the attitude which the Scandinavian nations should observe 
toward certain questions touching upon the duties of neutral States and to 

42 



make dispositions for the purpose of safeguarding their neutraUty. It was 
learned in this connection that the three countries are in complete accord 
regarding The Hague conventions. With regard to the different proposals 
put before the conference, that body agreed that in view of circumstances at 
present the governments of the three countries declare that there can be no 
question, either for them alone or acting in common vv'ith other neutral gov- 
ernments, of taking the initiative in any mediation between the belligerents or 
other analagous measures. 

"On the other hand, it was established that it would be desirable to estab- 
lish closer co-operation among the greatest possible number of neutral states, 
with a view to safeguarding their common interests, at the same time observ- 
ing the strictest impartiality." 

The understanding reached appears to contemplate : 

More initimate collaboration among the three powers. 

Exchange of information regarding the commercial policy of 
each power. 

Protection of the mutual commercial interests. 

Continued collaboration after the war. 

Closer co-operation amongst the largest possible number of neu- 
tral states, with a view to safeguarding their common interests. 

Swedish Premier's View 

Prime Minister Hammarsksjoeld, in an interview given to the 
correspondent of the Associated Press at Stockholm, October 4th, 

said : 

"The blacklist is objectionable, not only because of its present operation, 
but because it will affect the future of the victims. We feel that it constitutes 
an unjust attempt to deprive certain of our citizens of their rights, and we do 
not like to see any Swedish subject lose any of his rights as a citizen unless 
by judgment of the courts. 

"We are glad to know that the United States has taken steps in this 
matter, and we have welcomed other steps by the American Government in 
defense of the rights of neutrals and for the upholding of the rules of inter- 
national law. I may perhaps say that before our conference at Christiania 
we had striven to keep in touch with the United States in regard to action in 
this direction. 

"The Christiania communique lays stress on the desirability of more ex- 
tensive, and at the same time, more intensive collaboration of neutrals. We 
hope that the traditional politics of the United States will not prevent it in 
the present exceptional circumstances from interesting itself in such col- 
laboration. 

"It is impossible that the greater part of the rest of the world should 
continue indefinitely in the present unnatural and chaotic condition without 
America suffering also. 

"Restrictions which are felt in comparatively small measure by the great 
American may strike at our very vitals. We are convinced that in our situa- 

43 



tion the Americans, who appreciate as much as we do the independence of 
a country and the legal right of its citizens would feel and act exactly as 
we do." 

After remarking on the impossibility of Sweden's offering 
mediation and referring to America's steps to secure observance of 
the rules of international law, the Minister said : 

"America is in the fortunate position that she is the greatest of all neu- 
trals, far removed from the strife, and with great resources. She really does 
not need to be greatly concerned about whether this or that step does make 
her unpopular with the one or the other belligerent." 

British Reply 

A London cable despatch to the Associated Press, October 6, 
said: 

"We are anxious to restore to its old footing the ancient friendship and 
commercial intercourse between the two countries," declared Lord Robert 
Cecil, Minister of War Trade, today in an interview with the Associated 
Press in which he replied to the recent statement of Premier Hammarsksjoeld 
of Sweden. 

To the assertion of the Swedish Premier that Great Britain arbitrarily 
is limiting imports into Sweden, Lord Robert said that Great Britain 
has always been and is now ready to enter into fresh negotiations for a 
trade agreement with Sweden, in which case allowances would be made for 
all of Sweden's requirements, which, he admitted, are greater now than 
before the war, owing to the development of her industries. 

The Minister of War Trade declared incidentally that the British black- 
list violates no rule of law or equity. He continued : 

"The Prime Minister says that he is in harmony with the American pro- 
test against the blacklist. As to the merits of the blacklist controversy, I 
explained before that the blacklist is an attempt to prevent British subjects 
from trading with enemy firms or with firms that trade in the interests of the 
enemy. For the Swedish Prime Minister or any neutral to claim that we 
should compel British firms to help enemy trade when their country is engaged 
in a life-and-death struggle is a claim for which there is no precedent and 
which cannot be admitted. For the British Government to prevent its own 
subjects from helping the enemy is to violate no rule of law or equity or 
morals, and is an elementary precaution taken in the interests of national 
safety. 

"With regard to commercial measures taken against trade with Germany 
through Sweden, Great Britain and her allies are as one in their determination 
to use naval forces in preventing the import of goods to enemy countries. 
No one surely can complain of that. It is impossible for us to permit unre- 
stricted imports into neutral countries, by which such neutral countries 
become the channels of supply for the enemy. At the same time we are and 
always have been anxious to facilitate the import into neutral countries, 
including Sweden, of all goods needed for home requirements, allowing for 
the normal development of industries, provided that satisfactory guarantees 

44 



are obtained either from the importers or a Government body that no goods 
in any form will be re-exported to the enemy. It follows that the unre- 
stricted import of goods which would release home products of similar 
nature for exportation cannot be agreed to by us." 

Lord Robert said that the best plan for arranging imports is undoubtedly 
through agreements such as exist with Holland, Norway and Denmark, where 
all goods are controlled by a central association or by associations of traders 
interested in the various industries. This plan provides for the distribution 
of goods to reliable traders, and prevents corners for the raising of prices. 
In conclusion. Lord Robert said : 

"But for any negotiations to be successful there must be co-operation by 
both parties. Unless we can get full information from Swedish sources 
regarding home requirements and conditions of trade, no agreement can be 
reached." 

In a newspaper interview with the Associated Press on Septem- 
ber 8th, Lord Robert Cecil, British Minister of War Trade, said : 

"It is not likely that Great Britain will change her blacklist policy at the 
request of the United States. 

"The ideas expressed by some of your newspapers that Great Britain is 
adopting a deliberate policy with which to injure the United States is the 
purest moonshine, since outside of our own Dominions our trade with the 
United States is most important. Of course, natural trade rivalry exists, but 
no responsible statesman in this country would dream of proposing an 
insane measure designed to injure the United States Commerce. 

"Any impression that the blacklist is merely an entering wedge for a 
trade warfare after the war may be dismissed at once. I assure you the 
blacklist is purely a war measure, and I cannot insist too strongly that the 
government is taking every precaution to guarantee its enforcement so as 
to cause as little hardship as possible to innocent traders." * * * 

It was pointed out to Lord Robert that the belief prevailed that 
the shipments of consignments of firms trading with blacklisted firms 
might be refused from United States to other neutral ports through 
the fear of not getting coal. Lord Robert replied : 

"The fear is ungrounded, as we have no desire to interfere, nor do2s 
the law contemplate any interference with legitimate trade. We are taking 
precautions to prevent an unjustified extension of the blacklist. The real 
purpose of the Paris Conference was to arrive at some plan by which to 
prevent any resumption or extension of the politico-commercial system pre- 
vailing before the war in the first place, and, in the second, to devise means 
for accomplishing, both for ourselves and our allies, the enormous task of 
reconstruction. We fully realize that such a plan must involve readjustment 
of existing treaties, which, with their favored-nation clauses, now stand in 
the way. However, it must be remembered that with the exception of this 
country, which has no tariflf wall, all countries have constantly evaded and 
violated the favored-nation clause." 



45 



PRESS COMMENT AND DISCUSSION 

BRITISH 

The views of British newspapers and reviews on the Paris 
resolutions divided on tariff Hnes. The measures for the war period 
were generally endorsed but the suggestion of customs preference 
evoked sharp differences of opinion. 

London Times 

{Conservative, June 23) 

It is clear enough by this time— not only from the official record 
of results, but from the statements of those who are best quahfied 
to judge them— that the Paris Economic Conference achieved to 
the full the success for which its advocates confidently hoped. It is 
no slight feat for the delegates of so many nations, each with inter- 
ests and economic doctrines of its own, to have reached a compre- 
hensive agreement, not merely upon the financial and economic 
measures to be taken against the enemy as military weapons during 
the struggle and during the period of reconstruction to follow it, 
but also upon the main lines of their common policy on these sub- 
jects when that period has come to an end. Only a revolution in 
the general outlook of the Allied peoples and Governments could 
have made this feat possible. That revolution has been wrought by 
the war. As the German political and military offensive trans- 
formed the Triple Entente into a fighting Alliance, so has the Ger- 
man economic offensive forced upon the Allies the necessity of an 
equally close defensive alliance in the economic sphere. None of us 
realized until .the war broke out how far that insidious offensive 
had been carried within our own countries. Unconsciously we had 
all become tributaries in varying degrees to German trade and 
dependent upon Germany for some of our essential supplies. It is 
hardly an exaggeration to say with Mr. Hughes that German pene- 
tration had brought this Empire within an ace of ruin. The war 
has rent the veil behind which the Germans worked. It has brought 
home to us all the truth that, in these days, trade and national safety 
are inseparable parts of a single whole. 

The Paris Resolutions are the unanimous and official recogni- 
tion of this truth by the Allies. They constitute an admirable frame- 

46 



work for such a policy as the entirely new situation created by the 
war imperiously demands. But they are at present no more than a 
framework. The real success of the grandiose projects they are 
intended to initiate depends almost entirely upon the way in which 
the framework is filled, and, above all upon the spirit in which the 
work is begun and is continued. Mr. Hughes, who made on Wed- 
nesday another admirable speech on the subject, insists upon this 
truth with characteristic clearness and vigor, and the delegates 
themselves are hardly less emphatic. There are still influential 
persons in England who believe that our old relations with Germany 
were inevitable and should be resumed immediately after the war. 
That is impossible, but the mere effort to make it possible might, 
unless it were defeated in advance, knock the bottom out of the 
policy just formulated in Paris, and reopen the door for the subtle 
German trade devices which cost us so much, and which went near 
to costing us all. Mr. Hughes is unquestionably right when he says 
that the overwhelming majority at home as well as in Australia are 
determined that these relations shall not be renewed. He is right, 
too, when he observes that the influences working against the Paris 
policy should not be underrated. The cry has been raised that this 
policy is a policy of perpetual war, transferred from the military 
to the economic domain. It is a dishonest cry, as M. de Broque- 
ville, the Belgian Premier, showed in the eloquent speech with which 
he closed the Conference. The economic alliance will be essentially 
such a defensive alliance as we have constantly advocated in these 
columns. It does not aim, like the schemes of the Central Powers, 
at domination over the markets of the world. What it purposes is 
to secure for the Allies and for neutrals independence from the 
"intolerable yoke" which these Powers seek to fasten on the necks 
of others. 

It is impossible to do more at present than to touch upon a few 
of the particular measures recommended by the Conference. They 
relate, as we have mentioned, to three periods — to the duration of 
the war, to a period of transition after the war, and to the future 
after this period has elapsed. The war measures are excellent, and 
are already partly in force. All that is needed is that they should be 
applied more fully and consistently by all the Alllies. Greater 
stringency is particularly desirable in regard to the prohibition of 
trade with firms and companies partly under the control or influence 
of enemy subjects, and in regard to the cancelling of contracts with 
such subjects It is equally necessary that the operations of inter- 

47 



national finance and of its representatives in the Allied countries 
should be strictly controlled both during and after the war. But it 
is the proposal that the Allies shall refuse "most-favored-nation" 
treatment to the enemy for a number of years to be fixed by the 
Allies that is likely to prove most disconcerting to Germany. Though 
this is one of the transitory articles, we fancy that once the Allies 
have liberated themselves from the grip which this system has given 
her on their trade, they will be slow to place themselves under it 
again. The positive recommendations of a permanent character aim 
at the right goal and are conceived in the right spirit. They show a 
comprehension of the truth that the economic situation arising out 
of the war and the problems attending it cannot be dealt with by 
muttering any shibboleth. The task of the Allies is not to secure 
"tarifif reform" or "free trade" as ends in themselves. It is to vin- 
dicate their economic independence of the enemy countries and to 
foil the organized attempts of these enemies °to reduce the world to 
economic servitude. That is only to be done by the frank accept- 
ance of many new economic principles. 

Manchester Guardian 

(Liberal, Free Trade, June 21) 

"The anxiety which chiefly exercises the mind of the Confer- 
ence appears to be that for the purposes of reconstruction Germany 
will wish to supply us all with materials and appliances below cost 
price. To avert the calamity of being able to buy cheaply special 
arrangements are to be made for the common defense against 'dump- 
ing.' Enemy goods, manufactures, agricultural products and ship- 
ping are all to be subjected to special treatment. There is either 
to be actual prohibition or something of 'an effective character,' 
presumably a tariff of a protective nature, or for shipping, we sup- 
pose, regulations sufficiently penal. 

"For all these proposals there may be two quite different mo- 
tives. One motive is to keep the Central Powers weak, that is to 
say, it is to prolong the stage of hostility over the reconstruction 
period. Whether this may be justified or not, depends in the first 
place on the kind of end to which we are able to bring the war. 
If that end should turn out to be such as we desire there should be 
no such necessity. It depends also on the length to which the period 
of reconstruction may extend. Is prohibition or a prohibitive tarifif 
to be prolonged indefinitely, or will a term be fixed after which 
normal relations may be resumed so that the world may have some 

48 



hope of settling down? If not, we have as yet no vision of per- 
manent peace before us, but only one of armed truce. 

"It may be said, however, that these proposals have quite an- 
other motive ; that their object is not so much to weaken the enemy 
as to strengthen the Allies, but economically the Allies will not be 
strengthened but weakened by the refusal of cheap supplies from 
the Central Powers. These supplies will go instead to neutrals, who 
in their turn will step into the trade with Germany and her friends 
that had previously been done by us and our friends. Neutrals, 
already enormously enriched, will gain still further at the expense 
of the belligerents, while the work of reconstruction, which interests 
us all, will be hampered by the restrictions of the market. In a 
word, these proposals are calculated to compass the prolonged 
impoverishm.ent of both parties to the present war, to the advantage 
of neutrals, who alone will be free to trade with both sides. 

"Permanent protection the Conference does not advocate, but 
it sets forth the economic independence of the Allies as an ideal. 
The methods that are to be used are to be congruous to the economic 
principles of the several Governments, which being interpreted 
means, we suppose, that this country is not called upon "to depart 
from Free Trade Jorever, but may pursue other measures of Gov- 
ernmental culture of non-remunerative industries. As to the de- 
sirability of economic independence there is pretty general agree- 
ment. We are glad to see that one sound method of securing it for 
the Allies conjointly is recognized by the Conference to lie in meas- 
ures for facilitating trade between the nations. The most obvious 
of all such methods, however, is not mentioned. It is that of 
removing all tariffs on goods of Allied countries. Here the Con- 
ference has surely missed an opportunity. In demanding rigid 
protection against the Central Powers for the transitional period 
it might very logically have suggested an equally thorough system 
of free exchange as between the Allies. That this course — so clearly 
in line with the conception of an economic interest common to all 
the Allied Powers — should not have been suggested indicates the 
dominance of the Protectionist influence. We have the strong-est 
desire to cooperate in all things as far as possible with our Allies. 
But many of the resolutions adopted by the Conference are based 
on an economic reasoning which we believe to be thoroughly fal- 
lacious, and some of the results of which would, we think, be espe- 
cially injurious to ourselves. For this reason, with the strongest 
desire for unity in all things essential, our Parliament will have to 

49 



claim the liberty of closely scrutinizing the concrete proposals in 
which the recommendations of the Conference may take shape, and 
that not for their bearing on any general principle of Free Trade, 
but for their probable effect in accelerating or retarding the revival 
of the country after the war and its power to hold its own in the 
competition of the world." 

Dr. Dillon's View 

A clear exposition of the problems involved is contained in 
articles published in the London Daily Telegraph of June 16 and 17 
by Dr. E. J. Dillon, a well-known publicist. He wrote in part : 

"How delicate and complex a matter it really is may be in- 
ferred from the fact that two of the issues were withheld from the 
purview of the Conference, and reserved for the consideration of 
the interested Governments, namely, the means of favorably affect- 
ing the international exchange and the measures to be resorted to 
in the matter of Customs." 

"The importance of influencing the exchange in favor of our 
Allies cannot easily be over-rated. It is possible that it may be 
settled satisfactorily by the Governments themselves, but settled it 
must be, radically and permanently, and without much further delay, 
for the sake of our Allies, ourselves, and the Alliance. 

"The extent of our future commercial relations with Russia 
depends largely upon that. Let us suppose for a moment that things 
are left, as they now are, indefinitely. What will happen? After 
the war Russia's rate of exchange will still be considerably under 
par, whereas that of Great Britain and France will have risen to its 
normal level. The financial plight of Germany and Austria will also 
be such that the international exchange in Berlin or Vienna will 
approach more nearly to that of Petrograd than to that of London. 
One of the direct consequences of this inequality between ourselves 
and our Allies will be that Russia's commercial custom will be irre- 
sistibly drawn to Germany and Austria, and away from Great Brit- 
ain. For Russia's' industrial and commercial requirements could 
then be much more cheaply supplied by the two first-named coun- 
tries than by ourselves, because the purchasing power of the Rus- 
sian rouble will be greater in the Central Empires than in Britain 
and France. Machinery, for instance, which would cost, say £10,000 
in Manchester, would be obtainable in Stuttgart or Chemnitz for 
about i8,500 worth of roubles. 

"In such conditions, however cordial the relations between the 
two Allied peoples might be, it is clear that sheer interest would 

50 



prompt the Russians to purchase in the cheapest market, which 
would in turn import the produce it needed from its Slav customer, 
and on the same grounds." 

Dr. Dillon enumerates the sacrifices made by Russia to protect 
exchange, pointing out the difficulties therein encountered, and adds : 

"If one inquires what remedy can be suggested for this phe- 
nomenon, which is really the effect of an economic law, the answers 
are divergent. One of them is embodied in a suggestion that an 
international paper currency should be created by the Allied nations 
for the duration of the war, the value of which would be identical 
among them all, and therefore immune from fluctuations. This 
expedient is simple, and sounds facile and satisfactory, but like 
most simple solutions of complex problems, it is in reality so difficult 
of realization that it can hardly be regarded as practical. 

"More serious is the proposal for the issue of a Russian loan, 
which Great Britain and France should co-jointly guarantee. 

"How arduous this task of reconciling the various interests 
will be may be inferred from their divergency. Take Russia as an 
example. Her chief exports are cereals, timber and general agri- 
cultural produce, and her best customers for these are Germany 
and Britain. Her competitors are our Colonies, India and Argentina. 
If we give a preferential tariff to the Colonies, as policy and senti- 
ment prompt, Russia, it is alleged, will be thrown into the arms 
of Germany. The enormous trade done between Germany and 
Russia before the war was caused and fostered by the cheapness 
of German manufactures and the facilities offered for payment. 
In order that the Tsardom should withdraw that custom after the 
conclusion of peace and deprive herself of her best customer, it is 
clear that similar cheapness for the purchase of her requirements 
and like easy terms of payment must be offered by her Allies, and 
also an equally profitable market for her own produce. Analogous 
considerations apply to imports and exports of our other co-part- 
ners." 

"The dilemma may be briefly expressed thus : If our future tar- 
iffs favor the Colonies, one of which is Russia's keenest competitor, 
the Slav Empire will be forced to have recourse to Germany for 
her foreign trade ; and if, on the other hand, we give no preference 
to the Colonies, which have cheerfully and steadfastly stood by us 
in the hour of our need, offering up the sacrifice of their best for the 
cause of the Empire and the race, we shall be throwing away a 

51 



unique opportunity of founding a real empire, asserting our kinship 
and displaying our sense of gratitude. * * "i- 

"An idea occurred to a well-known economist in Paris, which 
this is not the place to analyze, that it might perhaps be feasible to 
divide the total of Russia's annual exports among her Continental 
Allies. For example, one might calculate, on the one hand, the 
quantities of produce she can afford to sell, now that her own 
people's requirements have increased so considerably since the pro- 
hibition of vodka and ascertain how much went to the Central 
Empires before the war; and, on the other hand, the total required 
by all the Allied Nations and the amount they were wont to pur- 
chase from Germany and other neutrals. It might then be possible 
for the Continental Allies to take over the total. I mention this 
suggestion without comment. 

"The direction in which I personally look for the most accep- 
table solution is that of British Imperialism working in concert with 
our Allies on the broadest basis possible." 

London Daily Telegraph 

{Conservative and Tariff Reform, June 22) 

"The conclusion which we draw is that British statesmanship 
must absolutely disregard, for the time being, all preconceived fiscal 
notions. To talk in terms of Free Trade or Protection is absolutely 
irrelevant. These formulae are two years out of date. They have no 
bearing on the new problem. The old patient to whom these pre- 
scriptions were tendered was killed in the war. There is a new 
corpus on which the crucial experiment has to be made. That was 
fully recognized at Paris by the British delegates who are prepared 
for any commercial restriction which may be found necessary, and 
for the many changes in her fiscal system which Great Britain will 
have to make if she is to remain a loyal and whole-hearted friend 
to her friends. 

"We shall also have to put our own commercial house in order 
and negotiate with our Allies in a spirit of give-and-take on the 
various questions of commercial law, patents, transport, etc. And 
for the beginning, how could this country better facilitate commer- 
cial intercourse than by the adoption of the metric system of decimal 
coinage? If we drop our insular system of coinage, weights and 
measures, it would be a great boon to ourselves and to all our cus- 
tomers and correspondents throughout the world, wherever the 
metric system is in vogue." 

52 



The London Morning Post 

(Conservative) 

This staunch advocate of Tariff Reform complains that the 
signatories of the Conference agreed that in adopting permanent 
measures of mutual assistance the Allies "have regard for the prin- 
ciples which govern their economic policies." 

^Tf this saving clause," says the Post^ "really meant that Great 
Britain meant to do nothing outside the limits of Free Trade, then 
nothing at all of any value could be done, and we might as well 
resign ourselves to the 'intolerable yoke' of Germany. There can 
be no such reservation. All the Governments must be free, not only 
to subsidize enterprises and to develop natural industries and re- 
sources by financial aid and technical research, but to use 'customs 
duties or prohibitions of a temporary or permanent character' where 
necessary. If Great Britain declines to accept that position she 
frustrates the whole intention of the Conference." 

The Spectator 

(Conservative) 

"Free Traders must frankly acknowledge the fact that princi- 
ples which they regarded as demonstrably sound under peace con- 
ditions are not applicable under the conditions of quasi-warfare, 
which will certainly continue to exist when the present war comes 
to an end. It is equally important for Tariff' Reformers to remem- 
ber that their primary conception of Protection for the home market 
conflicts fundamentally with schemes for combined action on the 
part of the Allied Powers. In laying down this second proposition 
it is important to make our own position perfectly clear. We en- 
tirely repudiate the idea that either France or Russia, while main- 
taining her protective system against us, has any right even to expect 
that we should necessarily maintain a free import system for her 
benefit. We do not claim any right to interfere with their domestic 
arrangements, and we may assume that they equally recognize our 
right to establish domestic Protection for ourselves if we should 
decide that it is in our own interest so to do. The point is that it 
is almost impossible for British Ministers simultaneously to work 
for jomt action with our Allies against Germany, and also for Pro- 
tection against those Allies. In turn, when our Allies come to con- 
sider how practically to establish working arrangements with Great 
Britain for defence against the common enemy, they will probably 

53 



find that their system of domestic Protection seriously hampers 

their freedom. Whether they will be able in practice to modify 

that system in the face of internal political p^essure is another 
matter. 

"The same considerations apply to our own Dominions, and the 
same difficulties arise. Both Free Traders and Protectionists in Eng- 
land have often dreamed of the desirability of establishing a com- 
plete system of Free Trade within the British Empire. We may 
be nearer to the realization of that dream than ever before, but we 
certainly cannot yet see it taking shape. In all the Dominions the 
Protectionist spirit is still strong. Hitherto all that has been done 
in the way of encouraging trade relations between different parts of 
the Empire has been through the establishment of Colonial preferen- 
tial tariffs; but in practice these tariffs have nearly always been 
arrived at, not by lowering the Colonial duties on British imports, 
but by raising the duties on foreign imports. In other words, the 
Dominions have hitherto followed the policy of domestic Protection 
even against the Mother Country and against one another, while 
increasing the scale of Protection against foreign countries. In 
saying this we are not blaming or criticizing the Colonial Govern- 
ments ; we are merely noting the facts. At the moment it does 
not seem that either in France or Russia or Italy or in our own 
Dominions is there any great prospect of the abandonment of the 
policy of domestic Protection. Consequently the practical question 
which the Paris Conference has to consider is how far it is possible 
to fit in this policy of domestic Protection with the wader policy of 
Allied action against the German enemy. On such a point no gen- 
eral principle can be laid down; the matter is obviously one of de- 
tail, and the details must depend on future rather than on present 
facts. There is, however, one very important point which ought 
at once to be dealt with. If the Allied Powers are to take in the 
future common action against German commercial methods, they 
must have their hands free to impose tariffs upon German goods 
which they do not impose upon the goods of one another. That 
means that Germany must not be entitled to claim most- favored- 
nation treatment. 

"This is of all points perhaps the most immediately important 
for the Paris Conference to settle. In the Treaty of Frankfort, 
which ended the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, there was inserted 
a permanent most-favored-nation clause regulating the commercial 
arrangements of France and Germany. This clause was inserted 

54 



at the request of France, but most French people seem to be agreed 
that it was Germany who drew the greatest advantage from it. At 
any rate, there is not likely to be any French opposition to a refusal 
to insert a similar clause in any treaty of peace that may follow the 
present war. Nor need there be any opposition from Great Britain. 
It is true that the most-favored-nation clause, which forms part 
of our commercial treaties as well as of those between other Powers, 
has on the whole served us well. It may be, as is alleged, that in 
particular cases the Germans have dodged the obvious meaning of 
t-he clause by introducing extremely complicated definitions of goods, 
so as to obtain advantages for themselves, while denying them to 
the other contracting Powers. Apart from this trickery, the clause 
has had the advantage of enabling our exporters to profit by any 
reductions in tarifif that any other nations agreed upon between them- 
selves. Nevertheless, we must no\v be prepared to sacrifice that 
advantage, whatever it may have been worth. For unless the Allied 
Powers reserve the possibility of establishing preferential tarifif 
arrangements among themselves, they will be able to do very little 
indeed to counteract German commercial methods. 

"Up till quite recently the question of preferential trading has 
generally been approached from the point of view of import duties. 
But it is clearly possible, and may even be more important, to deal 
with it also by means of export duties ; and one of the points which 
will probably be discussed in Paris is the possibility of reserving 
natural products to the manufacturers of the Allied Powers by 
means of a system of preferential export duties. Within the last 
few days, indeed, a definite suggestion in this direction has been 
made by a Government Committee which was appointed to deal 
with the question of the export of oil-producing nuts and seeds from 
our West African Colonies. This Committee, over which Mr. 
Steel-Maitland, presided, has reported in favor of the imposition of 
an export duty of not less than 12 a ton upon all seeds exported to 
ports outside the British Empire." 

The London Economist 

The Economist, edited, at the time of the Conference, by Mr. 
Francis W. Hirst, an unyielding Free Trader, points to the declara- 
tion of the treaty that "the benefit of most-favored-nation treatment 
shall not be granted to the enemy powers during a number of years, 
to be fixed by mutual agreement among themselves," and to the fur- 
ther provision that "the Allies decide to fix by agreement a period of 

55 " . ■ ■ 



time during which the commerce of the enemy Powers shall be sub- 
mitted to special treatment, and the goods originating in their coun- 
tries subjected either to prohibitions or to a special regime of an 
effective character." 

"But we had always understood," says the Economist, "that 
the most-favored-nation clause was the sheet anchor of our Free- 
trade system and Free-trade diplomacy, and that neither Mr. 
y\squith nor Sir Edward Grey had recanted their Free-trade 
opinions ! 

"The principal Allies are four— one, Russia, has the highest 
protective tariff in Europe, France and Italy both have tariffs on the 
whole higher than those of Germany and Austria, while the fourth 
Power, Great Britain, offers a free market to the whole world. Do 
our Colonies and Allies wish their products to be taxed, and have 
Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey turned Tariff Reformers?" 

"Then, again, we would ask, is the idea of a trade war after 
the peace seriously entertained by our idealistic rulers? 

"In Russian and Italian circles in London, writes a corre- 
spondent, the resolutions passed at the Economic Conference have 
been somewhat critically received. Russia's geographical situation, 
apart from any other considerations, compels a vast proportion of 
her export trade to be carried on through Germany and Austria, 
even were Constantinople a free port. So far as the (a) measures 
(i.e. for the war period) are concerned, Russia has already taken 
very drastic steps zvith regard to German businesses within her own 
territories. The (b) or transitory measures are of a more contro- 
versial kind, while those under (c) measures for 'mutual assistance,' 
need considerable revision before they can be made applicable to 
Russian conditions. These considerations apply to some extent to 
Italy also; for Austria-Hungary and Germany form the most nat- 
ural outlets for Italian products. Even in the 'transitory' stage the 
Italian may have to come to a commercial understanding with Ger- 
many, if not with Austria-Hungary as well, somewhat different 
from the suggestions laid down in the resolutions. Although en- 
deavors will he made by London and Paris to finance Italian indus- 
tries after the zvar, actual trading between Italy and the Central 
Empires can hardly cease. As the resolutions stand, indeed, they are 
said to be drazvn in favor of French industries, particularly the 
'luxury' exports, and of English Protectionists. And the question 
suggests itself at once, what of neutrals ? This is asked more fre- 
quently in Italy and Russia than in England and France, although 

56 



Mr. L. A. Martin, chairman of the council of the London Chamber 
of Commerce, said to a representative of the Manchester Daily 
Despatch (June 22nd) : What we are very much concerned about 
in regard to the future is as to hozv the Allies will treat neutral coun- 
tries. There is a grave danger that those countries, if they feel they 
are in a had position, may be driven to and embraced by Germany 
and Austria, and this point requires very careful consideration.' " 

"Fairplay" 

"Fairplay," one of the leading British journals devoted to ship- 
ping finance, said on August 10th : 

"America so far has evaded the fight, but she is bound to recog- 
nize two things (apart from the fact that we are not out to be 
beaten) firstly, that the nations who win this war, whether they be 
the Allies or the Central Powers, will not be in a temper to stand 
any nonsense from any neutrals; that the winning combatant coun- 
tries will represent the main armed forces of the world, and that 
no one else will be in the running. Secondly, America will appre- 
ciate that the Allies, pace Mr. Asquith, do intend, where it pays 
them to do so, to put up a tariff wall between themselves and 
neutrals. They mean to restore themselves and to become self- 
supporting— at some expense it may be while the operation lasts, 
but certainly not for the benefit of neutrals. And if this be so, then 
America has perhaps a somewhat awkwardly restricted market. 
She has already experienced the pleasures of a Chinese boycott, but 
at the close of the war she will be facing as a competitor a Japan 
which economically, financially, and by treaty is a vastly dififerent 
proposition from the nation which could be openly flouted over 
California issues a few years back." 

British Ministry of Commerce 

"A few things that want attention," according to Ernest J. P. Benn i 

in the London Evening Standard of July 19 are : ' 

L We have got to raise an annual revenue more than twice as 
large as in 1913-14. ! 

2. We have got to repair the material damage done by the war. 

3. We have got to find employment for our soldiers and muni- 
tion workers. 

4. We have got to fill up the empty warehouses of the world. 

5. We have got to take Germany's place in France, Italy and f 
Russia. 

57 



6. We have got to pay higher wages than ever before to our own 
people. 

7. We have got to cheapen production to compete with Germany 
and America in neutral markets. 

FRENCH COMMENT 

La Revue de Paris, 

May 15, 1916 

"The dangers of an Economic War," an article by Max Hoschil- 
ler (La Revue de Paris) recalls that Mr. Asquith advised the British 
members of the House of Commons designated as representatives of 
the Economic Conference : 

"Whatever you do, be careful not to allow yourselves through excite- 
ment or blindness or by natural sentiments, caused, I will not say by the desire 
of vengeance but of cementing the victory, to take measures which will do 
you more harm than the enemy." 

This article was written before the Conference took place and it 
conceived the purpose of the Conference to be a sort of protectionism 
in four degrees, that is, 1. Reciprocal preferential tariffs between 
the United Kingdom and its possessions ; 2. Reciprocal and preferen- 
tial tariffs, but in second line, between the British Empire and the 
Allied Powers ; 3. Favorable treatment, but in third line, for neutrals ■,' 
4. Prohibitive tariffs for the Powers at present enemies. 

British Imperial Customs reciprocity according first preference 
in the United Kingdom to the British Colonies, declared the writer, 
would bear more heavily upon Russia than upon either Germany or 
Austria-Hungary. The proportion of wheat imported into England 
from Russia has remained practically stationary, while that of the 
oversea dominions has vastly increased. The prediction is made : 
"H Mr. Hughes should establish dift'erential tariffs between 
the serials from Canada, Australia and India, and the serials of 
Russia, the latter will be driven out of the English market. The 
article continues : . 

"Professor MigouHne, President of a special commission in the Russian 
Ministry of Finance, wrote recently that Russia could not accept the form of 
protectionism in four degrees and thus lose the German market, unless it 
receives compensation from the Allies. What compensation? Measures 
facilitating the exportation of Russian agricultural products. 

"On March 9th last, in a report presented to the Pan-Russian Agri- 
cultural Congress, Mr. Boradaievsky stated that the Allies must facilitate 
the exportation of products of the Russian soil, failing which, Russia would 
be obliged to make with Germany, after the war, a treaty of commerce 
including the most favored nation clause. Mr. Rostovtzefif, member of the 

58 



Russian Parliamentary Committee of Commerce, claims nothing else than 
a monopoly for Russian serials in the English market, to the exclusion of the 
Canadian and Argentine; that at the same time the Allies should engage 
themselves to import only Russian wood, instead of that from Sweden or 
Norway. * * * 

"Even if England had been willing, without doubt she would not have 
been able to accede to the desires of the Russians expressed in a form so 
categoric; the honorable member of the Douma appears to have forgotten 
that Canada is a British colony and cannot be excluded by the mother 
country. * * * 

"It would have been interesting to have heard Mr. Hughes, the great 
Australian propagandist of the economic war, explain how the British 
colonies could, without compromising their prosperity, entertain with powers 
like the United States, for example, relations accosdihg to the formula ; door 
open between the Allies ; door half-open to neutrals. 

"To obtain manufactured goods, the colonies do not always apply to 
the mother-country. In fact, the exchange in the limits of the British Empire, 
that is to say between the United Kingdom and its colonies, increases rapidly 
(124.9 per cent, for the period from 1890 to 1902), more rapidly than the 
commerce of the Empire with foreigners (105.8 per cent.). Without denying 
this general tendency which, furthermore, is still more accentuated in the 
inter-colonial exchanges (149 per cent.), therefore excluding the mother- 
country, Britain's part in the total provisioning of the colonies decreases 
sensibly; foreign competition is very strong and still continues, either on 
account of superior methods of sale and production, or advantages owing to 
geographical situation. 

"The example of Canada is striking. In this important market the 
United States holds an incontestable supremacy, in spite of preferential rights 
of 33.33 per cent, which English products enjoy; during the fiscal year 
1914-1915, the Un'ted States imported a value of 426,617,000 dollars, whereas 
England's part attained only 90,086,000 dollars; the figures for the year pre- 
ceding, 1913-1914, are respectively $410,786,000 and $131,943,000. 

"Is it in the interests of Canada to impede the importations from the 
United States to the profit of the mother-country, or to pay dearer for the 
products which the latter would not be in a position to furnish? To-day 
less so than ever, because the war, by its financial reverberation, has rather 
strengthened the bonds that unite and will always unite the United States and 
Canada, by reason of their proximity geographically and by the force of 
attraction exercised on a more feeble country by its trusted powerful neighbor. 

"It is shown, in fact, by recent declarations of the president of the 
Bank of Montreal that the commercial balance between Canada and the 
United States during the past year was 113 million pounds in favor of the 
latter, and to this is to be added the annual interest of about 32 million pounds 
on the previous Canadian debt, making a total of 145 million pounds. On the 
other hand, the commercial balance with England for the same period amounts 
to 191 million pounds in favor of Canada, but this sum is automatically 
reduced to 41 million pounds, by taking into "account the annual interest of 
150 million pounds due to Great Britain. 

"With the exception of one loan of 5 million pounds, Canada did not ask 

59 



in 1915 any capital from London, as it had done during the years preceding 
the war ; it has even reduced the Treasury Bonds placed on the English 
market at the commencement of the war by an amount of 10 million pounds, 
to the nominal sum of 325,000 pounds. In return, the United States advanced 
to Canada important sums for military expenses, about 142 million pounds, 
while the preceding year Wall Street only advanced 50 million. 

"This financial dependence on New York will not permit Canada 
to treat with the United States otherwise than on the basis of reciprocity of 
tariffs. In any case, it is very unlikely that they will begin an economic 
struggle with their powerful neighbor. 

"It is not certain, furthermore, that the Dominions will consent to accord 
to their mother-country the reciprocity of this favorable treatment of which 
they show themselves so exacting. In London they are very skeptical on 
this point— and with just reason. * * * 

"Although not yet fully developed, the colonial industries believe that 
they have found the best method of protecting themselves against foreign 
competition in fixing customs duties, and they depart in no way from their 
principles when it is a question of English importations. Their governing 
powers had scarcely been accorded before the governments of the Dominions 
adopted protection. Canadian manufacturers are continually demanding new 
tariffs and enjoy at the present moment concessions that artificially stimulate 
their manufactures. Australia also seems to be quite prepared to make large 
sacrifices in order to be able to transform its raw materials in its own fac- 
tories instead of sending them to the United Kingdom. 

"It is difficult to imagine the colonial manufacturers, the most decided 
protectionists, renouncing their private interest and according special con- 
cessions to English manufactured products, so that the farmers may more 
easily dispose of the cereals, meat and wool, goods which find ready purchasers 
in the international market. Already certain of the most important Aus- 
tralian newspapers representing the industrial interests, thoroughly disavow 
the turbulent propaganda undertaken by Mr. Hughes on his arrival in 
London. * * * 

"It is difficult to understand how the plans for the economic war, as 
exposed by those in favor of protectionism of 4 or 3 degrees (especially by 
Monsieur Edmond Thery), have received the least sympathy in France. 
Bringing with it as a necessity the return of the prohibitive regime under 
which England lived from 1651 to 1847, it is clear that it would harm to a 
great extent the interests of France. * * * 

"The principal products of France, such as silk goods and silk mixtures, 
enter into the United Kingdom free, without paying customs duties or even 
any physical tax. What would happen if the formula of protection in three 
degrees were accepted? Whatever may be the difference applied by Great 
Britain in the treatment of enemy, neutral and allied products, it is nevertheless 
a fact that all French exports would come up against a barrier of custom duty 
not before existing. This is the most certain result from the French point 
of view and the policy of reprisal against Germany. * * * Will this 
economic war against Germany justify the establishment of customs duties 
on fresh flowers, feathers, raw silk, wool of all kinds, woolen rags, goods 
which Germany never sends to England and which constitute a French 

60 



monopoly? Will these tariffs on ready-made garments, automobiles, silk, 
ribbons, cloth, wool, manufactured goods, in respect of which France has, in 
spite of German competition, an incontestable superiority, not affect infinitely 
more the French than the German industry? 

"The character of necessity which dominates the Anglo-French ex- 
changes has often been pointed out. The following words of the distin- 
guished commercial attache in London, Monsieur Jean Perier, are often 
quoted: 'The nations who sell to England or who join with her in the inter- 
national traffic may be classed in two distinct categories: in the first place, 
nations whose natural resources, and more particularly the aptitudes of race, 
are similar to those of England, and in the second place, nations whose nat- 
ural resources and aptitudes of race and unlike those of that country. In the 
first category are the United States and Germany, in the second, France.' 

"Is that to say, however, that by charging French products with tariffs 
more or less high England would not impede their sales? France exports 
the superfluous, and when England, to procure more important resources, 
establishes fiscal duties on importation, it commences always by striking a 
blow at this superfluity and thus against French products pre-eminently." 

The writer declares that the British campaign against unneces- 
sary importations has been accentuated in a manner disquieting to 
French industry, due, first, to the British tariff duties and then the 
prohibition of importation of automobiles, musical instruments, 
Hquors, rum, porcelain and basket work, and says : 

"After the war, protecting tariffs may definitely follow those which, 
to-day, have still a temporary and fiscal character, and thus share the very 
foundations of the Franco-British commercial entente. It is not to be over- 
looked that very severe taxes have already been imposed in the interior of 
England on the consumption of these same objects of luxury, of which the 
commerce is the prerogative of France. * * * 

"The true corollary of the cordial entente would be a Franco-British 
treaty of commerce, the basis of which would be established by mutual con- 
cessions : England renouncing the supplementary taxes imposed on wines and 
spirits, reducing the fiscal duties on fruits and other products, and, in return, 
France extenuating certain tariffs and suppressing the surtax on storage 
which weighs so heavily on merchandise transported by way of English ports." 

The writer, obviously a free trader, next considers the possibility 
of renouncing a protection of four degrees simply by interdicting 
Austro-German products or by reprisals against them. He quotes 
members of the Douma as protesting that a boycott against Ger- 
many, whose products Russia has bought because they were obtain- 
able at the lowest price or on more advantageous conditions than 
from England or France, and that cessation of commercial relations 
with Germany would mean for Russian consumers an increase in 
the cost of living. Mr. Boublikoff, a member of the Douma, is 
quoted as saying: 

61 



"If we agree to combat Germany we must claim from our Allies that 
our interests will be looked after and that this struggle against the reinforce- 
ment of Germany will not be at the price of our own impoverishment." 

And Mr. Migouline is again quoted : 

"The question is whether the Allies, especially France and Italy, are 
ready to lower their tariffs on cereals and wood imported from Russia." 

Mr. Hoschiller continues : 

"The painful lessons of this war have demonstrated flie fact that the 
industrial power of Russia is far from corresponding with its political role. 
This dis-proportion appears so abnormal that last year the Committee on 
Protection of the Industrial and Commercial Association affirmed in its 
general report that if Russia did not double her means of production within 
ten years a catastrophe was inevitable. It is consequently necessary to follow 
up industrialization of the great Slav Empire with greater energy than ever 
before. 

"Sharing the error, common to all protectionists, most of the Russian 
producers believe that in restricting foreign imports of whatsoever origin, 
they will more rapidly attain their ends. They carefully refuse to attribute 
the same political purpose to the conquest of markets by France or England 
as to the 'peaceful penetration' by the Germans, but are inclined to view it 
unfavorably from the economic standpoint. * * * 

"Is it to the interest of France to prohibit the importation of German 
merchandise into her country? What she buys from Germany is first of all 
coal. There is no remedy for this situation as long as she does not make use 
of her waterpower, because France lacks coal and is dependent on foreign 
countries. We cannot, however, without ruining all French industries, arti- 
ficially maintain freights at the frightful level which they have reached 
to-day, which would fatally happen if we should persist in supplying ourselves 
exclusively in England. 

"France, on her side, furnished Germany with materials necessary for 
the industries, especially raw cotton and cotton waste, wool and woolen waste, 
raw skins and hides and minerals. Moreover, industrial Germany is one of 
the best purchasers of agricultural France. The market of Cologne is the 
center of re-expedition of early fresh French vegetables and fruits (primeurs). 

"Some people appear to wish to ignore the fact that from 1889 to 1909 
France sold more to Germany than she bought from her." 

"Economiste Francaise" 

A journal which has followed the economic happenings of the 
war very closely has an article in its copy of June 17th, 1916, which 
seems to represent the opinion of the leading French economists. 

After pointing out that in the interest of the co-operation of 
the allies during the war and during the time immediately after the 
war it will be necessary to proceed quickly the article explains that 
not all the allied nations are placed in the same situation. Some are 
partly invaded and find themselves attacked and of the allied na- 

62 



tions Great Britain only has escaped invasion. The article says 
further that the allied nations must assist each other in the most 
cordial and faithful manner and that those most attacked must 
receive help from those which are attacked least. This creates cer- 
tain economic and financial obligations. 

The period of transition between war and peace also presents 
duties the fulfilment of which, if not of immediate necessity, is 
nevertheless near. Germany has been able until now to preserve 
the immunity of her territory and of her industrial resources. 
Means must be studied and determined upon to hinder Germany 
during this transitory period, during the armistice and the peace 
negotiations to exercise this considerable advantage by returning 
to her habitual method of dumping and unfair competition. Im- 
portant technical questions will arise out of this. With regard to 
the period of the re-establishment of the final economic order after 
the war, the journal is of the opinion that the alliance between the 
members of the Entente must survive the war and that this alliance 
must be very close and effective and must have as much permanency 
as can be had in human things. It is necessary that during some 
centuries to come the nations of the Entente remain united, so as to 
master the German monster and to keep it from throwing itself on 
one of them or to endanger their life and progress. 

The allies must be prepared for various eventualities. So in 
case an economic union of the European central powers should 
form, efficient measures should be prepared to fight it or to neutral- 
ize its effects. 

The writer finally comes to the conclusion that it is of the 
greatest importance to state again that the allies have a common 
interest in war and peace which will keep them united and willing 
to co-operate. 

GERMAN COMMENT 

The New York Times 
July 18, 1916 

"Representative organs of German trade and industry are in- 
clined to comment both bitterly and rather sarcastically upon the 
economic conference in Paris on June 17, at which the powers of 
the Quadruple Entente outlined a trade campaign against Germany 
to be carried on for an indefinite period after the end of the war. 

"The Hamburger Nachrichten of June 22, after describing what 
it calls the futile attempt to erect a Chinese wall against German 

63 



trade, accuses Great Britain of having organized the plan with the 
selfish idea of exploiting the war in her interest and shoving aside 
the uncomfortable German competitor. Then the Hamburg paper 
declares : 

" 'We are thoroughly of the opinion that the German army and 
navy will still have some work to do before anything serious can 
be said from the German side as to the value of the Paris decisions. 
We therefore express no opinion about the intention of the Allies 
to impose special conditions on the shipping of their present foes, 
or on the permanent measures England and her friends propose 
regarding raw materials and manufactured articles which they 
could hitherto only obtain from Germany. Events will surely take a 
different course than the theorists gathered round the Paris con- 
ference table imagined. Let our enemies remember once for all that 
war is only ended on the basis of negotiations, and that the victor- 
ious side is easily in position at the signing of peace to slash to 
pieces with its sharp sword such paper agreements as those to which 
it has neither assented nor is inclined to assent.' 

"The Hamburg shipping organ incidentally expresses the be- 
lief that the action of the London Chamber of Commerce in expelling 
all enemy-born members is 'a war measure, which will not be per- 
manent.' The Chamber's action is attributed to "Englishmen having 
forgotten in their blind zeal what the English commercial spirit has 
to thank German commercial training for.' " 



64 



CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 



Reciprocal Trading Relations and Tariffs 

At a special meeting in London on March 1st, 1916, the Asso- 
ciation of the Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom 
adopted the following resolution expressing the most advanced idea 
of inter-Imperial and inter-Ally preference and discrimination 
against and between neutrals : 

"That this Association is of opinion that, with the objects of 
maintaining and increasing our trade after the conclusion of the 
war, it is necessary that the different parts of the British Empire 
be drawn into closer commercial union, and that our trading rela- 
tions with our allies be fostered and that for the accomplishment 
of this purpose it is desirable that provision should be made : — 

"(a) For preferential reciprocal trading relations between all 
parts of the British Empire ; 

"(b) For reciprocal trading relations between the British Em- 
pire and the allied countries ; 

"(c) For the favorable treatment of -neutral countries; and 

"(d) For restricting, by tariffs and otherwise, trade relations 
with all enemy countries, so as to render dumping or a return to pre- 
war conditions impossible, and for stimulating the development of 
home manufacture and the consequent increased employment of 
native labor. 

"That His Majesty's Government be without delay requested by 
deputation from this Association to invite representatives from the 
colonies and the allied countries to confer in the first instance sep- 
arately and subsequently collectively with representatives from this 
country with the object of arriving at common action." 

The Council of the London Chamber of Commerce on June 25, 
1916, adopted a report of the Chamber's special committee on trade 
during and after the war, including the following outline of a sug- 
gested tariff: 

"The Committee after having consulted representatives of var- 
ious interests concerned, including (a) manufacturing, (b) food- 
stuff's, (c) raw and semi-manufactured products, (d) foreign trade 

65 



(import and export), (e) British Empire (import and export), (f) 
shippini( and carrying, recommend for consideration the adoption Ijy 
the United Kingdom of t]ie following suggested schejne for a ten- 
tative tariff as a basis for negotiations by his Majesty's Government 
in the proper quarters : — 

Rate of Duty ad val. 
Per cent. Per cent. Per Cent. 

Max. General Min. 

(a) Wholly manufactured goods 30 20 10 

(b) Semi-manufactured goods and 
articles solely used as raw 

materials in industries 15 10 5 

(c) Foodstuffs manufactured 7^ 5 2j4 

( d ) Foodstuffs raw 5 2J4 Free 

(e) Raw materials Free ^ Free Free 

(f) Articles such as wines, spirits, Existing war rates or modifications 
beer, tobacco, and other articles thereof during period of tentative 
now dutiable tariff. Plus 50 per cent, for enemy 

countries. 

The foregoing classification and rates are suggested subject to 
certain reservations and exceptions to meet the case of special 
trades, among which are the following : — 

(a) No objection would be raised to the maximum and mini- 
mum rates of duty being increased relatively to the figures under 
other headings if found advisable. It is assumed that a drawback 
or rebate on re-exports would be allow^ed. (b) A special reserva- 
tion should be made in the case of imports from China of certain 
articles which are really raw materials, inasmuch as China, owing 
to treaty restrictions, is unable to negotiate on a reciprocal basis. 
(c) Where countries in the British Empire can produce sufficient of 
any raw material for their home consumption and export similar 
raw material from foreign countries shall be subjected to import 
duties suf^cient to maintain and develop Empire industries, and 
such raw materials from enemy countries should be subject also to 
a penalizing tariff', (f) Reference is made to the advisability of 
preferential treatment of the British sugar industry. 

'Allocation of Duties 

Those proposals apply to (I) British Empire; (II) present 
Allies; (III) friendly neutrals; (IV) other neutral countries; and 
(V) enemy countries, and the duties, other than raw materials (e) 
and present dutiable articles (f), might be allocated as follows: — 

British Empire countries — Minimum rate ten per cent., five per 
cent., 2^/2 per cent., and free, less any percentage of duty these coun- 
tries may accord as a preference to the Mother Country — e.g., 

66 



Canada now gives approximately one-third off to United Kingdom, 
therefore duty on Canadian manufactured goods would be 6^ per 
cent, and pro rata. 

Present Allies. — Minimum rate ten per cent., five per cent., 
2^ per cent., and free. 

. Friendly Neutrals (giving U. K. most favored treatment).— . 
General rates twenty per cent., ten per cent., five per cent., and 
2^ per cent. 

Other Neutral Countries. — (Those giving preference to other 
foreign countries.)— General rates twenty per cent., ten per cent., 
five per cent., and 2}^ per cent. Plus surtax equal to preference 
given to other countries. 

Enemy Countries. — Maximum rate thirty per cent., fifteen per 
cent., 7y2 per cent., and five per cent. 

The revenue to be obtained from the suggested tentative tariff 
is approximately estimated at about 745^ millions sterling. 

The report also states that the Allied Governments should be 
asked to impose special dues on shipping of enemy countries using 
the ports of the allied countries, and recommends that "His Maj- 
esty's Government be urged to guarantee for a period of years the 
continuance by subsidy or otherwise of new, or 'key' industries 
established prior to, and since the commencement of, the war." 

The main objects to be achieved by the scheme of the Com- 
mittee would be : — 

(a) To provide for mutual preferential trading relations be- ■ 
tween the United Kingdom and other parts of the British Empire. 

(b) To increase trade between the Allies and the British 
Empire. 

(c) To widen the basis of British taxation and produce revenue 
to assist in meeting the cost of the war. 

(d) To give a moderate protection to labor and capital em- 
ployed in British industries. 

(e) To provide a means for future tariff negotiations with 
neutral countries. 

Influence of Conference on United Kingdom Tariff 

No extensive system of tariff" preferences can be developed 
among the Allies while the United Kingdom retains its Free Trade 
policy. The coalition formed for the conduct of the war drew into 
the British Cabinet a number of prominent tariff' reformers who had 

67 



long advocated a protective or revenue tarilt for the United Kingdom 
under which a preference could be given to Colonial products, and 
advantageous agreements negotiated with other countries for the 
encouragement of British foreign trade. The "political truce" with 
which the coalition was supposed to be accompanied, has prevented 
revival of the tariff reform movement by these advocates, but the 
tariff conference is hailed by many as renewing the necessity for 
abandonment of Free Trade on the score that it opens the rich 
United Kingdom markets to the world, while British exporters are 
confronted by high tariff walls throughout the world. Free Traders 
insist that the war has proved the value of this policy to England. 

Prime Minister Hughes, of Australia, appears to have been 
the most emphatic. At the close of the Conference he said : 

"The interest, aims and striving of each of our partners in 
the common struggle, which will follow this war, are confronted 
with two dangers of unequal magnitude, — annihilation by the enemy, 
who will thwart every attempt on the part of each separate state to 
maintain its independence, and a number of disadvantages accruing 
from the concessions to each other which constitute the price they 
must pay for successful combination." 

The renewed activity of the tariff movement in England has 
also increased the agitation of the supporters of free trade. Not 
only have several of the free trade associations started a renewed 
campaign in favor of free trade, but also a number of prominent 
men have come forward in support of it. A statement in favor of 
free trade circulated in England was signed amongst others by the 
Earl of Beauchamp, Lord Bryce, Mr. Hirst, etc. 



68 



Scandinavian ^Nations 




Other Neutral Countries in Ei 


. 1 

Sweden 


o 




a 


■73 

I— 1 

•i-H 

CO 


c 
a, 


( 


1 2,462,660 

J 18,099,155 

^ 20,078,465 

1 41,101,930 


$ 2,688,015 

8,911,960 

18,701,770 

30,737,110 


$ 2,194,485 

11,945,390 

5,304,430 

30,111,480 


S 6,409,035 
10,306,275 
58,742,805 
77,145,720 


$ 170,120 

374,495 

19,460,005 

21,062,005 


$ 1,560,895 
11,547,865 
25,520,690 
39,257,870 


1,2 

8,1 
9,7 


i 1,723,000 
2,074,400 

« 713,200 
4,510,600 


375,800 

495,200 

1,182,000 

2,053,000 


1,820,600 
3,669,600 
1,782,000 

7,272,200 


3,813,200 

5,331,200 

5,887,200 

15,031,600 


15,514.200 
34,690,000 
31,103,400 
81,307,600 


210,600 
10,547,800 
15,357,200 
28,012,600 


1 

3 

1,5 

2,1 


) 

5,157,361 


2,223,820 


19,042,682 


66,600,372 

17,676,467 

184,310 

73,951,761 


158,969 


1,376,764 


8,6 

6 

4 

10,1 


"[ot recorded 


1,000 


Not recorded 


Not recorded 


89,600 


Not recorded 


1,0 


■ 














3,242,400 


3,596,200 


3,501,600 


73,519,800 


1,432,400 


8,884,200 


3,5 


i 176,500 


196,700 


798,600 


1,577,400 


Not recorded 


6,654,800 


Not r( 


895,800 


884,200 


857,200 


3,214,400 


49,832,600 


3,622,000 


2,9 


8,100,000 

7,400,000 

4,625,000 

37,300,000 

57,450,000 


11,150,000 

1,700,000 

2,150,000 

25,275,000 

40,433,500 


16,850,000 

7,825,000 

3,425,000 

42,800,000 j 

70,972,000 


25,150,000 
40,525,000 
12,650,000 
94,975,000 
173,411,500 


15,150,000 
16,275,000 
17,550,000 
84,600,000 
134,019,250 


125,000 

2,075,000 

2,150,000 

30,475,000 

35,756,250 


1 

6 

9 

32,3i 

35,0i 


2,141,000 


912,200 


2,019,000 


7,112,200 


33,413,800 


1,733,000 


25,5 


Fot recorded 


17,200 


Not recorded 


442,200 


48,000 


17,800 


2- 


[ot recorded 


Not recorded 


Not recorded 


1,838,830 


SmaU 


Small 


2,6 


X 


13,508,501 


17,551,270 


48,046,357 


169,267 


2,484,911 


1. 


6,670,500 


X 


2,295,200 


5,021,500 


42,750 


3,127,500 




2,955,200 


2,187,200 


X ' 


729,200 


Not recorded 


137,000 


Not rt 


10,433,600 


Not recorded 


7,304,000 


X 


Not recorded 


4,770,800 


2,4( 


1,820,000 

i 1 ^ 


720,000 


1,360,000 


2,300,000 


X 


6,140,000 


l,6t 



CHART I. United States— Inter-European Commercial Treaty Fabric. Showing Treaties in effect and those abrogated by war. 



CHART I. Showing the date of the most important agreements, con- 
ventions, etc., regulating commercial intercourse between 
the United States, the Powers of Europe, and among the 
latter. Agreements abrogated by the present war are 
indicated by red cross lines. 

Allied Group 



The figures show the month, day and year when the convention wa. 
signed. The commercial relations of the European Powers are baaed 
on a network of agreements, conventions and orders in council The 
figures represent as a rule, commercial agreements. Some of the ex- 
ceptions and interesting facts are specially indicated. 



Central Group 



Scandinavlaa Countries 



Other Neutrals 




Note: — In such cases where several agreements exist the date represents either the 
most important or the latest concluded. In the case of open spaces there is the pre- 
sumption that no agreement is in existence as no public records could be found. 



The Balkan States re-established their former commercial relations at the end of 
the Balkan war, 1913-1914. Notation "re-established after war" refers to the Balkan war. 
♦ Since this chart was prepared Eoumania has joined the Entente Allies. 



CHART II. Commercial Intercourse United States — Europe 



The figures represent the value of exports as represented in the official statistics of the countiy, 
the name of which appears on the left side of Chart. Figures refer as a rule to 1913, exceptions are 
specially marked. 



Allied Group 



Russia, 1012. 






Export 
from/to 



United Kingdom. 



Muiiteiiugro. 



Bel^iiiin, 1912.. 



Food, drink and tobacco, 

Raw materials and articles mainly unmanufactured 

Articles wholly or mainly manufactured 

Total 



Foodstuffs, 

Articles necessary for manufacturing purposes, 

manufactured goods 
Total 



$ 40,803,000 
56,449,000 
175,047,600 
272,299,600 



Foodstuffs, 

Raw materials and partly manufactured goods, 

manufactured goods 
Total 



Total export, 1910, S498,250 



Portugal, 1912. 



For exchange purposes the mil reis has been 
taken =S 1.00 



Italy.. 



GermanyT, 



Bulgaria . . 



Turkey, 1911-1912 



Nonvay . 



Germany exported! dur- I'oodstuffe, 
ing 1913 $462,250,000 Raw materials 
to the countries forming Half mani^actured gi 
the British Empire. Manufactured goods 
Total 



■4 



Roumanift, 1911. 



Greece, 1912. , 



Central Group 



Scaodinavian .Nations 



76,836,460 

85,004,371 

1,547,600 

168,915,370 



3,200 



52,100,200 



76,500,000 

18,225,000 

30,350,000 

235,350,000 

359,556,275 



65,443,800 



4,847,600 



Other Neutral Couptrlfl In Eurnnp 



: 5,626,180 
47,419,410 
87,128,215 

144,694,940 



S 10,842,055 
27,615,555 
50,831,460 
90,513,415 



24,910,171 

18,716,395 

443,648 

49,078,384 



46,206,200 



21,675,000 
28,975,000 
32,025,000 
114,600,000 
199,976,500 



16,248,600 



1,764,800 
4,337,400 
6,340,000 
12,442,200 



Not recorded 



12,196,000 



3,625,000 
34,300,000 
23,9,50,000 
162,675,000 
239,549,800 



23,065,000 



i 188,030 



3,200 
3,600 
56,200 
63,000 



Not recorded 



Not recorded 



Not recorded 



34,800 



400,000 

325,000 

125,000 

4,000,000 

4,852,250 



11,103,800 



Not recorded 



Not recorded 



Not recorded 



S 7,219,015 
13,412,100 
42,267,125 
66,198,665 



400 

200 

1,400 

2,000 



1,400 



Not recorded 



Not recorded 



2,500 
2.500 



32,500 
37,250 



Not recorded 



Not recorded 



Not recorded 



Not recorded 



17,687,800 
108,682,400 
102,389,800 
228,760,000 



6,350,649 

22,751,510 

295,191 

20,460,936 



835,600 



11,567,600 



11,375,000 
35.775,000 
21,075,000 
69,425,000 
137,998,750 



8,479,000 



3,058,050 



135,851,200 



5,640J)00 



0,057,600 



1.059,330 



439,915 
6,008,120 
10,694,240 
16,353,505 



i 1,229,930 
38,945,135 
30,835,860 
73,050,285 



237,400 

616,200 

4,625,600 

5,479,200 



343,714 



3,649,800 



1,982,400 



2,000,000 
700,000 
425,000 

9,900,000 
13,013,500 



772,000 



Not recorded 



Not recorded 



S 20,067,210 
33,602,410 
135,035,740 
203,385,f50 



3,387,000 
32,351,200 
24,712,600 
60,451,400 



26,674,955 

552,337 

6,814 

26,237,955 



777,000 



14,970,200 



X 



3,126,000 
8,100,000 
11,000,000 
76,050,000 
98,357,750 



46,245,000 



19,840,000 



O 



S 227,760 
5,356,550 
15,619,955 
22,403,840 



16,325,600 
70,681,800 
78,337,200 
164,344,600 



122,947,895 

88,969,934 

2,603,884 

226,913,947 



3,655,800 



Not recorded 



164,600 
1,628,000 
7,885,000 
9,668,200 



16,679,673 

16,460,565 

836,562 

36,704,288 



7,209,000 



44,229.400 



10.960,000 
78,500,000 
44,426,000 
141,726,000 
276,208,000 



X 



CQ 



36.315 

257,685 

2,028.775 

2,356,895 



S 1,142,940 

1,945,430 

35,474,740 

38,808.230 



180.600 

694.600 

1.019.800 

1,895.000 



02,499 

244,521 

1,186,027 

1.771.816 



317,600 



Not recorded 



1,346,400 



100,000 

75,000 

75.000 

7,325,000 

7,582,500 



7,729,000 



Not recorded 



1,119,800 
1,768,600 
14,505.200 
17,393,600 



9,869.400 



2,000,000 

175,000 

550,000 

21,875.000 

24,604,000 



20,567,600 



2,560,000 



1,178,440 



2.462.660 
18.099.165 
20.078.465 
41,101,930 



1,723,000 

2,074,400 

713,200 

4,510,600 



Not recorded 



895,800 



8,100,000 
7,400,000 
4,625,000 
37,300,000 
57,450,000 



2,141,000 



Not recorded 



Not recorded 



Commercial Intercourse of United State, with European Countries at »ar and European Neutrals. 



2,688,015 
8.911,960 
18,701,770 
30,737,110 



$ 2,194,486 
11,945,390 
5,304.430 
30,111.480 



375,800 

496,200 

1,182,000 

2,063,000 



884,200 



11,160,000 
1,700,000 
2,150,000 
25,275.000 
40,433,500 



912,200 



17,200 



Not recorded 



13,608,501 



2,187,200 



Not recorded 



S 0,409,035 
10,306,275 
58,742,805 
77,145,720 



1,820,600 
3,669.600 
1,782,000 
7,272.200 



Not recordec Not recorded 



867,200 



16,850,000 
7,826,000 
3,425,000 
42,800,000 
70,972,000 



2,019,000 



Not recordec 



Not recorded 



3.813.200 
5,331.200 
5,887,200 
15,031,600 



56,600,372 

17,076,467 

184,310 

73,951,761 



3,214,400 



25,160,000 
40,525,000 
12,660,000 
94,975,000 
173,411,500 



7,112,200 



Not recordec 1,838,830 



2.300,000 



15,381.400 



170.120 

374.495 

19.460,006 

21.062,005 



$ 1,560,895 
11,547,865 
25,520,690 
39,257,870 



15,614.200 
34,690,000 
31,103,400 
81,307,000 



Not recorded 



49,832,600 



16,160.000 
16,275,000 
17,560,000 
84,600,000 
134,019,250 



33,413,800 



Not recorded 



256,975 



S 69,165 
1.282,980 
8.160,065 
9,736,990 



210,600 
10,547,800 
15,357,200 
28,012,600 



8.884,200 



6,654,800 



3,622,000 



125,000 
2.075,000 
2,150,000 
30,475,000 
35,756,250 



1.733,000 



2,484,911 



3,127,500 



6,140.000 



Not recorded 



i 406,640 
3.003,375 
9,110,345 
12,683,390 



189,800 

395,600 

1,816,200 

2,100,600 



8,621,490 

699,574 

453,047 

10,161,683 



1,094.800 



356.000 

374.800 

3.242.800 

3,972,600 



Not recorded 



2,927,800 



150,000 

650,000 

925,IX)0 

32,300,000 

36,008,000 



26,598,000 



1,600,000 



3,631,200 



325,000 

276,000 

325,000 

5,150,000 

6,086,260 



7,046,800 



500,000 



10,038,650 
18,194,335 
115,243,780 
146.470,980 



6,744,000 
25,999,400 
63,328,400 
146,271.800 



215.839 
8,597,100 

188,439 
9.003,607 



For com- 
merce with 
U. S. Bee 
statistic 
below 



10.425.000 
33,325.000 
10,976.000 
124,050,000 
178,272,000 



For com- 
merce with 
U. S. see 
statistic 
below 



United States. 
1913 



Total exports' 
Total imports' 



'From United States statistics. 
■United States statistics do not record s 



» 546,997,911$. 146,100,201 
296,564,940 136,877,990 



25,363,796* 
26.958.690 



7.616 
695.063 



66.846.462 
41.941.014 



4,167.158$ 76,285,278$ 331,684,212$ 23,320,696 
6.870.223 54.107,364 188.963.071 19,192.414 



103.749$ 
440.537 



2.217.073 
9.917, 



$ 12.104.366$ 
11.174.419 



8.391.458 
8.418,359 



$ 18.687,794$ 126,909,862i$ 826,549 
2,974.670 36.180,967 23.260,180 



$ 31,471.723$ 2,417,591 
23,220,012 348,481 



$ 1,216,196 
3.179,816 



ports in large groups to individual countries. The detailed flgures given here represent 



SK i^ L'sjS o't vdua'tten^^,Si°ffl°"?' ^r'' ^^^^ Ger-nrany-as-c^nreired in"th7SiStlS"orth'«e"counW^"'M- 
by the rcceivin?cSrie» responsible for the apparent discrepancies between the American export values and those recorded 



' Since this chart was prepared Roumaoia has joined the Entente Allies. 



Commercial Intercourse of Japan with 

countries at war and United States 

(From JapanoM statlstlct) 

1913 

Import Export 

United Kingdom $ 61,368,486 ( 16,434,828 



France 

Russia 

.Scrvia 

Monteiiegi-o 
Belgium ... 
Portugal . . . 
Italy 



2,914,4 
20,471 



4.724,011 

8,135 

538,927 



30,114,S5t 
3,449,710 



1,852,766 

7,520 

14,708,364 



Germtiny 

Aust.-ia Hungary 


34,197,399 6,565,854 
1,946J)08 458,768 


Turkey 


12,873 96,900 


Allies in Europe 

British Colonies 

Other allied countries 
outside Europe 


69,574,625 65,608,071 
50,930,220 «,005,339 

6,302,595 2,663.303 


Total Allied Group . . .$ 126,373,340 $112,836,719 


Total Central Group.. $ 


36,15-,2S0$ 7.131,622 


United Slates $ 


61,204,186 $ 92,236,601 



United Kingdom, French, Russian and German 

Statistics of Imports from the 

United States 

United States statistics do not classify in 
large groups exports to individual countries, 
and the United States export statistics are 
admitted to have no such accurate basis as ' 
those of imports which pass through customs 
houses. The total import value in the coun- | 
tries below given is much higher than the I 
United States statistics of exports, but this is ■ 
partly due to the fact that the periods cov- I 
ered do not always coincide: I 

Imports into Foreign Countries from United ; 
States 

United 
Kingdom France 

Foodstuffs $251,864,060 $ lu,»a,3,4( 

Raw materials and 
articles for man- 
ufacturing pur- 
poses 322,645.430 149,340,40(r 

Manufactured goods 131,836,355 18,596,600 



Total $708,260,360 $178,060,400 

Russia Germany 

Foodstuffs $ 437,030 $283,500,000 

Kaw materials and 
articles for man- 
ufacturing pur- 
poses 28,183,272 109,925,000 

Manufactured goods 15,094,610 34,250,000 



Total $43,714,913 $427,779,600 



\ 



./ 



03 

i 
a 

o 

14 


a> 
o 

O 


CQ 

'3 




69,165 
82,980 
60,065 
35,990 


1 405,540 

3,003,375 

9,110,345 

12,683,390 


1 10,038,650 

18,194,335 

115,243,780 

146,470,980 


89,800 
95,600 
15,200 
00,600 


356,000 

374,800 

3,242,800 

3,972,600 


6,744,000 
25,999,400 

53,328,400 
146,271,800 


21,490 
99,574 
53,047 
61,683 


4,312,940 


215,839 
8,597,100 

188,439 
9,003,507 


94,800 


600 


For com- 
merce witli 
U. S. see 
statistic 
below 






54,200 


1,405,400 


5corded 


Not recorded 


27,800 


3,631,200 


50,000 
50,000 
25,000 
30,000 
38,000 


325,000 

275,000 

325,000 

5,150,000 

6,086,250 


10,425,000 

33,325,000 

10,975,000 

124,050,000 

178,272,000 


38,000 


7,046,800 


For com- 
merce with 
U. S. see 
statistic 
below 


19,200 


2,534,000 


r2,285 


1,929,810 


59,026 


175,075 


L9,500 


43,000 


icordec 


Not recorded 


57,600 


2,114,400 


)0,000 


500,000 

_ = , T^,-^ 



Commercial intercourse of Japan with 
countries at war and United States 

(From Japanese statistics) 

1913 

Import Export 

United Kingdom $ 61,368,485 $ 16,434,828 

France 2,914,496 30,114,859 

Russia 20,471 2,449,710 

Servia 

Montenegro 

Belgium 4,724,011 1,852,796 

Portugal 8,135 7,520 

Italy 538,927 14,708,364 

Germany 34,197,399 6,565,854 

Austna Hungary 1,945,008 468,768 

Bulgaria 

Turkey 12,873 96,900 

Allies in Europe 69,574,525 65,668,077 

British Colonies 50,936,220 44,605,339 

Other allied countries 

outside Europe 6,362,595 2,663,303 

Total AUied Group . . .$ 126,873,340 $112,836,719 

Total Central Group. . $ 36,15 ' ,280 $ 7,131,522 

United States. $ 61,204,185 $ 92,236,691 

Umited Kingdom, French, Russian and German 

Statistics of Imports from the 
United States 

United States statistics do not classify in 
large groups exports to individual countries, 
and the United States export statistics are 
admitted to have no such accurate basis as 
those of imports which pass through customs 
houses. The total import value in the coun- 
tries • below given is much higher than the 
United States statistics of exports, but this is 
partly due to the fact that the periods cov- 
ered do not always coincide: 

Imports into Foreign Countries from United 
States 



United 
Kingdom 

Foodstuffs $251,864,060 

Raw materials and 
articles for man- 
ufacturing pur- 



France 
10,123,400 



SHIPPING 



The Paris resolutions are general in their reference to prefer- 
ential shipping- policy and the possible measures thereof have been 
but little discussed in the British press. The Daily Chronicle 
(Liberal) however calls for the "better utilization of the Allied 
mercantile marines," and goes on to say : 

"All Allied shipping should be pooled, and there should be 
unified control in each country for the period of the war, and for 
at least a year afterwards. There will be a serious shortage of 
shipping when the accumulation of products and material is set free 
for shipments, and when general industries are restarted in the 
belligerent countries. But unified State control of all shipping will 
involve the better organization of Allied resources in general. I 
have discussed the subject with several members of the French Gov- 
ernment, and the plan is welcomed by them. The fuller control of 
shipping is therefore an immediate need and of future advantage 
to the Allied powers. As England has requisitioned at least sixty 
per cent, of British mercantile shipping, it should be a simple, prac- 
tical measure to control the remainder. If in each Allied country 
there was one control, and uniform action among the Allies, ship- 
ping would be used to greater economic advantage, and the freight 
charges of neutrals could be lowered rather than increased." 

The foregoing prompted "Fair Play," one of the leading ship- 
ping finance journals of England to retort : 

"If the suggestion of the Daily Chronicle were carried out, we, 
who possess 21,000,000 tons of shipping, would have to pool our 
fleet with those owned by our Allies, and when it is remembered 
that the steam tonnage of France totals 1,909,609 tons, of Italy 
1,513,631 tons, of Russia 851,951 tone, of Belgium 269,252 tons, of 
Japan 1,826,068 tons with Servia and Montenegro owning nothing, 
and that our vote would be of equal value with that of Montenegro, 
even the imagination of the Daily Chronicle would surely falter at 
the position of our shipowners and of the various industries in this 
country in need of tonnage. That such a policy would be 'welcomed' 
by our Allies I have no doubt, and that it would be for their future 
advantage is undeniable seeing that for them to have the use of our 
fleet at Blue Book rates, while our merchants, to meet their own 

69 



requirements, had to charter neutral tonnage at unheard-of-cost, 
would be a bit of business which even the best of friends could 
well refuse. 

"If Great Britain is to bear her share in the economic struggle 
which will ensue after the war between the Allies on one side and 
enemy countries and neutrals on the other, the first essential is that 
British shipowners should resume full and free control of their ves- 
sels, with power to sell their space in whatever way may be consid- 
ered by them to be best." 

"Fair Play" insists that as one of the terms of peace, Germany 
must be compelled to give ton for ton of her own shipping to re- 
place the vessels lost as a direct result of the war, a policy whereby 
"each nation could re-establish itself in its own relative pre-war 
position." 



7U 



EUROPEAN TARIFF SYSTEMS BEFORE 

THE WAR 



Several tariff systems had been long established in Europe at 
the outbreak of the war and are now operative except in so far as 
war conditions have modified them. The most popular has been 
that of a general tariff modified by a conventional tariff established 
through reciprocity negotiations with other countries. Some gov- 
ernments have preferred a less elastic system and used a dual tariff 
with fixed rates in each schedule. In France this is called the 
"general and minimum tariff," and in Spain, the "first and second 
tariff." Germany, whose commercial relations are, for the most 
part, supported by a general tariff modified by commercial treaties, 
has also established a few fixed minimum rates. While there is 
technically a great difference between a general tariff modified by 
conventional tariff arranged by negotiation and the minimum and 
maximum system, they are identical in possessing two schedules 
of which the lawer is applied to those nations with which close 
relations are necessary, and the higher against those countries 
whose commercial friendship is unimportant or undesired or where 
treaty relations have been interrupted by a tariff war. Several 
nations maintain single tarifts similar to that now in force in the 
United States, but the exigencies of commerce with contiguous 
territories have compelled modification by agreements not neces- 
sarily in the form of a treaty. Protective tariff countries frequently 
extend preferences to their colonies. Free trade England cannot. 
but her chief overseas dominions accord British products a sub- 
stantial tariff preference. At the beginning of the war Canada and 
certain other colonies increased their tariffs to raise war revenue, but' 
the increase was greater on neutral than on British goods, thus en- 
hancing the British preference. 

The net result of the operation of these systems before the war 
was practically to eliminate the higher European tariff rates, the 
commercial intercourse thereupon settling down to a general level 
of conventional or minimum rates. 

No European country was in a position to close a preferential 
agreement with another without disrupting the whole treaty fabric. 
International competition, particularly in manufactures, had become 

71 



intense. Germany had declared her intention of probably terminating 
all existing agreements at the end of 1917 and for that purpose spec- 
ial agreements had been made in several cases. A new German gen- 
eral tariff was in course of preparation. Russia was considering a 
tariff revision and the British tariff' reform movement was showing 
signs of revival in anticipation of German termination of existing 
commercial treaties and tariff revision about 1917. France was rest- 
less under the permanency of Article XI of the Treaty of Frank- 
fort which ended the Prussian War, and which obligated France 
and Germany mutually to the most- favored-nation relation. A 
brief description of the system in each European country follows 
(modifications due to war policy not being mentioned). 

Austria-Hungary: General tariff modified by conventional 
rates, practically all the latter extending to commodities imported 
from adjacent countries. Commercial treaties with Germany, Rus- 
sia, Switzerland, Italy, Roumania, Servia and a few others provide 
for special conventional rates which also extend to the other treaty 
countries. 

Belgium : Single tariff. 

Bulgaria : General and conventional tariff. The rates of the 
latter result from the treaties with Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Great 
Britain, Germany, France and Italy. They also apply to treaty 
countries. 

Denmark: General tariff, allowing only a few exceptions in the 
case of commerce with contiguous countries. 

United Kingdom : Free trade, imposing import duties only 
in a few cases for revenue purposes.* 

France : General and minimum tariff. Imports from treaty 
countries receive the lower rates of the minimum tariff. 

Germany : General and conventional tariff. Rates of the con- 



33 1/3% 



*Unfler a House of Commons resolution, dated Septeinber 21, 1915, the duties on 

a number of articles of ordinary import tariff were increased. Also the following 

new rates of duty were introduced: 

Motor cars, including motor bicycles and motor tricycles 

Accessories for the above 

Musical instruments, including gramaphones, pianolas, etc 

Accessories for the above 

Clocks, watches and component parts 

Hats 

Plate glass, per cwt Ss Gd 

Cinematograph filin, per linear foot — 

Blank film ' ^■i'^ 

Positives ^"^ 

Negatives ^" 

By several Orders in Council the British Government also has restricted or en- 
tirely suspended the importation of certain luxuries, as fruits, motor cars, high-class 

woods, etc., or made the importation of these articles dependent upon a government 

license. 

72 



ventional tariff extended to all European countries by treaty. Mini- 
mum rates on some commodities. 

Greece: General and conventional tariff. 

Holland: Single tariff. Government has power to modify 
specified rates in the interest of the home industries. 

Italy : General tariff accompanied by conventional rates in 
treaties with France, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, Germany, 
Roumania, Russi^, Servia, Japan and Spain. Conventional rates 
apply also to all countries giving Italy most-favored-nation treat- 
ment. 

Montenegro: Minimum and maximum tariff specifying only 
37 articles. 

Norway : Maximum and minimum tariff's are in use. The rates 
of the latter apply to treaty countries. 

Portugal : Single tariff with a few conventional rates. 

Roumania: General and conventional tariff. The rates of the 
conventional tariff extended in the treaties with England, Austria- 
Hungary, Germany, Belgium, France and Italy. 

Russia: General and conventional tariff, the latter resuUing 
from treaties with Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Portugal, 
Servia and Italy. These rates apply also to countries extending 
most-favored-nation treatment to Russian commodities, the imports 
of all others entering under the general rates. 

Servia: General and conventional tariff. The rates of the 
latter apply to treaty countries, including Austria-Hungary, Eng- 
land, Germany, France, Montenegro, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium 
and Turkey. 

Spain : First and second tariff. The lower rates apply to treaty 
countries. 

Sweden : General and conventional tariff. 
Switzerland: General and conventional tariff. 
Turkey : Single tariff. 



7Z 



EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL TREATY 

RELATIONS 

(see also chart i) 



The commercial relations among European nations before the 
war and between them and the United States and other non- 
European countries rested upon commercial treaties, conventions, 
and "orders-in-council" (or their equivalent), the latter usually 
resulting from conversations between the governments not always 
laid down in writing. The twin keys of the tariff situation have 
been British free trade and the most- favored-nation provision of the 
Frankfort peace treaty of 1871 which ended the Franco-Prussian 
war. No European government had reason to discriminate against 
products of the British Isles which offered the world's greatest free 
market. Neither France nor Germany could extend any tariff 
concession to a third that they did not accord each other, although 
French interests have complained that ingenious "specialization" of 
the German tariff' really did discriminate against France. 

Treaties Abrogated by War 

A brief outline of the treaties between Germany and the Allied 
Powers, abrogated by the war, is of interest, for the future rela- 
tions of these countries will depend upon the character of the 
treaties to replace them. In the event of Allied success the Paris 
Conference resolutions if carried out would forbid the renewal of 
treaty relations on the most-favored-nation basis. 

Belgium-Germany : The commercial agreement with Belgium 
dates from the year 1891 with an additional agreement from 1904. 
Its conventional duration is to the end of 1917. It is a most- 
favored-nation treatment, securing even advantages to both nations 
and necessitating a special agreement about the alteration of certain 
duties which, of course, had to be extended to all those nations 
having most-favored-nation treatment with the contracting parties. 

France-Germany: After the abrogation by the Franco-Prus- 
sian War of the commercial treaty of 1862 a clause was inserted 
into the peace treaty of Frankfort securing to each country from 
the other, most- favored-nation treatment to remain in force for 
all time, but, of course, abrogated by the present war. The agree- 

74 



ment was influenced by Germany's change from a low to a protec- 
tive tariff. It has been held by France that the most-favored- 
nation clause in the peace treaty and the impossibility of abrogating 
it has prevented her negotiation with others for special advantages 
for French commerce, the Treaty of Frankfort requiring that 
any concessions thus extended be equally extended to Germany. 

Great Britain-Germany: When certain British colonies ac- 
corded tariff preferences to products of the United Kingdom and 
other members of the Empire, but not to outsiders, it became 
necessary to abrogate the most-favored-nation treaty between Great 
Britain and Germany. Notice thereof was given by England, 
whereupon Germany decided to give Great Britain most-favored- 
nation treatment. This was- done by a special order issued by the 
Bundesrat which was reissued from year to year, and which was 
also extended to them by order of the Bundesrat against which the 
British Colonies allowed Germany their general tariff. An excep- 
tion was Canada which in consequence of the so-called commercial 
war had levied a surtax on German goods. This was removed after 
Germany allowed most- favored-nation treatment also to Canada. 

Japan-Germany: The agreement is a most-favored-nation 
treaty made in 1911 to run to 1923. A clause in the agreement 
allowed for a change in 1917 of the tariff agreement made at the 
same time. 

Portugal-Germany: A most-favored-nation agreement made 
in 1908, to run for five years and extended. 

Russia-Germany : The commercial relations with Russia were 
regulated by an agreement dating from 1894 with an additional 
agreement of 1904. The agreement is a most-favored-nation 
agreement. There is also a special protocol dating from 1897. The 
commercial relations between Russia and Germany had been dis- 
turbed for some time before the outbreak of the war, and difficulties 
arose in consequence of Russia introducing a special import duty on 
grain and flour. 

Servia and Montenegro-Germany : Most-favored-nation trea- 
ties. 

Italy-Germany : The commercial agreement with Italy is. a 
most-favored-nation treaty made in 1891, and was extended in 1904 
and again until the end of 1917. 

The Position of Turkey 

Turkey had a special position in the European commercial 

75 



treaty situation before the war. While the country had concluded 
a number of commercial agreements dating in several cases back 
into the eighteenth century, only those relating to direct frontier 
intercourse had remained of practical value to Turkey. Those 
agreements were renewed again after the Balkan war in 1913 by 
the peace treaties of 1914. Under treaty with the European powers 
Turkey's tariff was limited and extended, with few exceptions, 
equally to all nations. 

The Balkan Situation 

The Balkan States had made among themselves a number of 
commercial agreements regulating especially frontier inter- 
course. Most of these agreements were abrogated by the Balkan 
war and revived by the peace treaties. 

Tariff Relations of the United States with European 
Belligerents and Neutrals 

During the commercial treaty making and the adjustment of 
inter-European commerce on the most-favored-nation basis from 
1871 to 1904, the United States tariff was frequently revised. The 
annexation of Hawaii with the establishment of free trade with the 
United States, and the acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippines 
with the same ultimate result and the establishment of reciprocal 
tariff relations with Cuba as a condition of the freedom of that 
Island, presented several issues with European governments arising 
from the insistence of the United States upon being accorded most- 
favored-nation treatment. The United States has taken the posi- 
tion that reciprocal concessions do not constitute a violation of the 
most-favored-nation obligation ; in other words, that, since Cuba 
gives American imports a preference in exchange for the United 
States tariff' concessions on Cuban imports, the products of other 
countries which extend no preference to the United States are not 
entitled to the advantages which Cuba enjoys in the American 
market. The Payne-Aldrich tariff' in 1909 anticipated possible 
European denials of most-favored-nation treatment to the United 
States when the inter-European commercial treaties might be re- 
vised. The maximum and minimum system was adopted, the law 
providing that a maximum tariff of 25 per cent, ad valorem should 
be added to the minimum rates imposed upon imports from coun- 
tries found by the President to discriminate unduly against Ameri- 
can products. The operation of this tariff' brought the United 

76 



CHART III. Showing commercial relations between United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, U. S. A. and principal British dependencies: 
Values In Dollars. 







Import from 


Export to 


Import from 


Export to 


Import from 


Export to 


Import from 


Export to 


Import from 


Export to 




Canada 


South Africa 


India 


Australia 


New Zealand 






5104,568,130 

38,625,310 

8.389,155 

152,441,870 


I 9,791,630 

2,466,830 
100,214,830 
118,971,630 


S 4,290,320 

56,699,295 

1,077,880 

62,476,755 


S 9,046,665 

1,522,115 
101,417,415 
115,118,010 


5100,165,640 

106,707.150 
34,492,585 
242,102,450 


S 9.919,040 S 77,777.300 

2.734.785 92,027,476 
334.912.215 20,293,365 
351,130.725 190,326,250 


S 12,012,225 

1.659,895 
156,283,600 
172,352,260 


$ 44,377.905 

67.023,255 

212,110 

101.690,285 





United Kingdom, 1913 


Raw materials and articles 
mainly unmanufactured 


790,395 
47.997.760 
54.188.235 




Total 










1,007,800 
217,200 
030,000 

1,855,000 


104,800 

188,800 
293,600 


1,746.800 

5,138.200 

13.400 

6,898.400 


109,200 

30,600 
139,800 


9,656,600 
60,528,800 

1,000,200 
71,184,600 


252,000 
80,800 
93,000 

425,800 


6,216,000 

, 46,076,800 

171,200 

52.464,000 


271,200 

480,600 

1.786.400 

2.538.200 









Raw materialg 












Total 






Foodstuffs j 1 I 


6,169,367 

8,710,723 

43,584 

14,923,700 


266 
I,27S 
27,234 
28,928 












Raw materials i 




















1 






Foodstuffs 


13,625,000 

1,100,000 

25,000 

1,275,000 

16,064,250 


800,000 

1,000,000 

525,000 

12.750,000 

15,134,760 


100,000 
15,850,000 
1,275,000 

150.000 
17.405,500 


450,000 
50,000 

250,000 
10,975,000 
11,735,000 


26,660,000 

101,275,000 

5,250,000 

3,050,000 

135.434,750 


300,000 

500,000 

1.125.000 

34.750.000 

37.685 500 


6,375,000 
59,050,000 

8.475.000 

100,000 

74,020,500 


700.000 

300.000 

975.000 

20.1.60.000 

22.136.750 


7.5,000 

2,375,000 

75,000 

2,517,750 


26 000 

175.000 

175.000 

2.300.000 

2,671.500 








Partly manufartured goods 






Total 


U.S. A.. 1913 


Total 


120.571,180 


415.449,457 


3,305,552 


14,488,501 


116,220,691* 


15,108,956' 


10.956.200 


43,351,855 


4,3.15,162 


9,079,497 





* Including Sirnits Settlements and other British Indiah possessiong, 

**The Qkutm giveo in this statistic for thp U. K. exports, olso those ^'ven on Chart 2 represent exports ol manufactures and produce ol 
U. K. only and do not include transit tradi^. The Lrannit trade trsniuirleil by the English market during the year 1913 had a value of t&47,- 
676,185. Roughly, one-third ot the miirchandue rpHchine U. K- [rom hi-r colonies is reexported ai;ain, finding ita way either to Europe 
or to other markets. Also part of the mL-rchandise imported into U. K. from not Oritiah anureea ii re-exported auain. The percentage of 
re-shipmentB ol the total imports, faon-ever, is not more than 10%. The following statistic showa the re-eiportaof loreignond colonial mer- 
chandise to the most prominent customera o( U. K. in Europe, also those soins to the principal British colonies. 



Export of Foreiiiii and Colonial Merchandise from U. K. to several leading European and Colonial Markets, 1913. 



Food, 

Drink, 

and Tobacco 



Raw Materiftb! 

and pjirtly 

DiQnuf allured 

Goods 



Manufactured ! 
Goods 



and Tobacco 



manufactured 
Gooda 



Manufactured 
Goods 



AUied 
Group 



Belgium 

I'Vanco 

Italy.- 



Central; Germany __ 

Group \ Auslria-Hungary , 

»T i_i_ J Sweden- - ■ 

Neutrals* h„„^^ j _ i 



S 3,674.410 
4,218.610 
3.197.880 
714.200 
12,475.560 
1.922.685 
1.498.865 
6.969.016 



I 38.658.720 
30.551.200 
47.327.090 
2.829.255 
70.696.186 
3.103.396 
2.442.110 
12.541.420 



S 5.627.675 
2.323.560 
9.211.920 
1.516.705 
15.836.335 
1.471.160 
1.129.020 
6.903.325 



S 47.966.360 
37.103,145 
59,743,695 
5.069.236 
99.113.315 
6.497.760 
6.071.366 
25.464.435 



{Canada _ 
Australia 
British Indies... 
South Africa 



S 4,280.665 
1.186,585 
1.182.165 
4,132,335 



i 3.482.765 

1.811.230 

2,214.515 

396.216 



$ 9.795.S25 
13.790..585 
3.569.295 
6,039,735 



$ 17,661,335 
16,795,150 
6,986.430 
9.585,240 



France. 



Belgium— 



Portugal- 
Italy 



208,116,860 

138,469,765 

183,030 

121,1111,600 

19,670.330 

78.110.005 



Germany... 



Total export of U. S. to the European Market, 1913. 



Austria-Hungary 

Bulgaria. 



Turkey.., 



302,531,075 
28.902,400 
2,510,145 
40,059,736 
40,069,735 



Sweden... 
Norway... 



46,173,285 
33,338.900 
32.947.486 



Switzerland-- 
Spain 



1 106,507,325 
25.439.940 
43.164.590 
10.090.800 
12.979.945 



^ ::>i 



States close to tariff wars with France, Germany and Canada, the 
United States insisting that they all extend to the United States all 
the advantages accorded any other nation, except their colonies, or, 
in the case of Canada to the mother country and the sister colonies. 
A substantial victory was won by the United States in the case of 
Germany and France, but the Canadian situation was compromised, 
it being evident that the imposition of the maximum tariff on the 
great range of Canadian raw materials required by American indus- 
try would injure the United States quite as much as Canada. 

The Underwood-Simmons tariff abandoned the maximum and 
minimum system. It is a single level tariff with authority for the 
President to encourage foreign trade by negotiation of commercial 
agreements. For reasons explained elsewhere none have been con- 
cluded. -* 

Germany extends most-favored-nation treatment to American 
goods on the basis of a law dated February 5, 1910, but this 
embraces only such tariff reductions as were provided for by the 
treaties in force at that time. In consequence Germany «dift'eren- 
tiates against America in all those cases where lower rates have been 
made after that date. 

In France a large part of American imports are admitted at 
the minimum rates of duty. 

Generally speaking the position of the United States with re- 
gard to their commercial relations with European powers is not much 
different from that of the European powers amongst themselves, 
United States products being accorded most-favored nation treat- 
ment.* Practically all our favored nation treaties are terminable 
upon twelve months' notice. 

(See Commercial Treaty Chart I.) 



*It must, however, be kept in mind that the United States gets only such con- 
cessions as are provided for by treaties with other, mostly European, countries, -but 
there are no concessions granted to others on products in which the United States is 
largely interested, unless the contracting country also happens to have a strong 
interest in the particular concession. Whether this condition could continue If the 
United States became more formidable in export to Europe of manufactured mer- 
chandise the reader can judge for himself. 

77 



EUROPEAN INTERDEPENDENCE 

(SEE ALSO CHARTS 11 AND III) 



The four largest economic units now at war in Europe, the 
United Kingdom, France, Russia and Germany, have long carried 
on an extensive trade with each other. Germany has been the best 
customer of the United Kingdom in Europe and has shared with 
India and the United States of 7\merica the leading position among 
the countries buying from the United Kingdom, Germany bought, 
in 1913, $135,035,740 of goods wholly or mainly manufactured in the 
United Kingdom. This is more than France and Russia together. 
Also the United Kingdom was buying from Germany more than any 
other of the European countries, while Russia took the second place 
among the European customers of Germany. Russia again sold, in 
1913, to Germany goods valued at $226,913,947, being more than the 
combined custom of the United Kingdom and France. France, ac- 
cording^ to French records, had in the United Kingdom her best 
European customer, Belgium coming second and Germany third. 

Two countries exerted a deciding influence on the economic 
destinies of Europe, the United Kingdom and Germany. London's 
importance in the commercial organization of Europe was derived 
from its distributing and banking power. London, in this respect, 
took a unique position among the ports of Europe, being both the 
commercial as well as the financial centre of a vast economic system. 
The United Kingdom re-exported before the war goods not produced 
in the U. K. to non-European markets outside the British Empire, 
valued at $170,000,000, and to British possessions to the value of 
$65,000,000. The largest part of that trade was done via London, 
through the agency of shippers specializing in re-export trade. 

But the London shipper did not confine himself to collecting 
goods in London for redistribution. His business during the last 
twenty years had taken on a new aspect and, beside the distributor, 
he had become the agent of the European trade. English shipping 
lines were carrying the visitors from oversea to British ports. They 
all arrived finally in London and it was here that they made their 
first selections from the goods Europe had to ofifer. London ship- 
pers and agents for this maintained sample exhibitions where the 
foreign buyer could order for delivery from the manufacturer, who 
might be located either in England or on the continent. To facili- 
tate shipment and to save expenses it had become the general nilc" 

78 



not to have those goods shipped over London. They were shipped 
directly from the manufacturer to the oversea buyer. The trans- 
action, however, was financed by the London shipper and agent 
who received payment from the buyer and paid, on his part, the 
manufacturer. The shipper and not the actual buyer was respon- 
sible for payment to the manufacturer or producer. 

The conveniences offered by this system of trading were so 
great that continental manufacturers had little desire to change it, 
and London in this way made great profits in the form of com- 
missions. London became the money market of the world, where 
transaction between the European manufacturer and the foreign 
buyer were completed. All the leading continental and oversea 
banks had agencies in London to take care of the exchange busi- 
ness of their nations. Bills were drawn on London and the pound 
sterling had become the recognized monetary unit in the foreign 
trade. London took this position not by accident. Outside the 
real facilities which it offered by the system described, there was 
the fact that the London market stood open to all comers ; that there 
was no discrimination against anybody buying or offering, and that 
the nations of the world met in the London shipping market on an 
even basis. 

The importance of this fact was also re'alized on the European 
continent, and ports of countries with a protective tariff offered 
"free port" facilities for goods entering the port for further dis- 
tribution. In no case, however, was it possible to compete seriously 
with the wider and more liberal system of the London shipping mar- 
ket before the war. 

While the United Kingdom, supported by vast. colonial posses- 
sions, has been able to supply Europe with a great many commodi- 
ties nowhere else obtainable, Germany has gained her predominance 
on the continent mainly from her geographic position in the centre 
of Europe, which normally forces a large part of European trade 
either to accumulate in Germany or to pass through that country. 

Germany held the quickest commercial route between France 
and England on the one side and Russia on the other. Railway 
shipments were forwarded by sea from London to Hamburg and 
from there by rail to their Russian destination. This traffic was so 
important that it made necessary a special steamship line between 
F.nglish and German ])orls. Germany, 1)\' develo])ing the manu- 
facttu'e of certain specialties so as to gain practical! \- a inonopol)' for 
them, has been able to draw a large part of the trade in these coui- 

79 



modities in her direction. For many of the raw materials used in 
Germany the country, however, rehed largely on British colonial 
sources. Germany, in consequence, has heen a large customer 
of most of the British colonies. 

A large proportion of this trade was carried on directly between 
the colonies and Germany. The United Kingdom, however, ex- 
ported also to Germany goods not of its own production and consist- 
ing largely of British colonial produce valued at $99,113,315 during 
the year 1913, bringing the total exports of the United Kingdom to 
Germany, according to British official figures, to $302,531,075. Ger- 
many herself puts a total value of $522,750,000 on her total imports 
from the British Empire, which is 19.4 per cent of the total German 
import, while the exports are given with $462,250,000, or 18.3 
per cent of the total German exports in German statistics. The ■ 
relations of Germany with the British Empire have been growing 
steadily. Germany imported from the United Kingdom coal 
valued at about $45,000,000 a year, one-fifth, of the total German 
imports from the United Kingdom. Cotton and woolen yarn 
were making up another fifth of the German imports from the 
United Kingdom. The supply of this yarn, which in like quality 
could not be supplied in Germany, has been a necessity. The Eng- 
lish herring fishery has been largely interested in the German mar- 
ket. Germany's most important export to the United Kingdom has 
been sugar. Machines and electrotechnical goods also have taken 
up a large part of German exports to the United Kingdom, while 
according to German figures the exports of aniline and other dyes 
averaged about $5,500,000. Russia is nearly entirely dependent 
upon Europe for the disposal of her food products, which are about 
one-half of her total export. Eler best and most convenient cus- 
tomer was Germany, taking in 1912 foodstufifs at a value of 
$122,947,895, which is nearly as much as all the present allies of 
Russia together. Also Germany has bought from Russia raw ma- 
terials at a value of $88,969,934. Russia's second best customer for 
raw materials, however, was the United Kingdom, buying_ in 1912 
for $85,004,371. Of the foodstufifs exported by Russia, $273,000,000 
consisted of grain. Wood, with an export value of $76,250,000, 
takes the leading place amongst the raw materials, and flax, with an 
export value of $53,500,000, the second 

Of the lesser economic units among the countries at war, Bel- 
gium has had her best customer in Germany, which bought, accord- 
ing to Belgian statistics, goods valued at $201,491,000; France, $150,- 

80 



462,800, and the United Kingdom, $118,925,000. Owing to the in- 
fluence of faster railway traffic and the running of international 
trains the interchange of trade on the European continent, includ- 
ing also the United Kingdom, had practically removed the interven- 
ing political frontiers. It is shown by the statistics appended that 
all the industrial countries of Europe were doing a vast trade with 
their immediate neighbors. While a considerable percentage of this 
trade consisted in the selling and buying of industrial and agri- 
cultural produce for consumption in the buying country, the end of 
the last century and the beginning of the present brought also an 
exchange of raw materials and half-manufactured goods for the 
special purpose of improving those goods by the industrial facili- 
ties of the other country for immediate reshipment or eventual sale 
to a third market. This development has specially affected the 
foreign trade of Belgium. In fact, it is practically impossible to 
understand the commercial relations of Belgium and the rest of 
Europe independently from the surrounding territory and the Neth- 
erlands. The whole of the lower Rhine country, comprising parts 
of northwest Germany, northeast France, Belgium and Netherlands, 
has formed for many years an economic unit more or less 
independent of political boundaries. The large exchange of trade 
carried on over the frontiers of each of the countries mentioned 
which is especially large in the case of the Netherlands, by ship- 
ments of foreign goods landed in that country for use in Germany, 
seems to be absolutely necessary for the economic well-being of the 
territory in question. Capital frequently interlocked in that region 
of the world, and it happens not only occasionally but is the con- 
tinued rule that industrial plants on one side of the frontier were 
preparing half-manufactured goods for completion on the other. 
Servia, economically, was entirely dependent upon Austria and 
Germany, both countries taking, together, by far the largest part of 
the exports of Servia. 

The commercial interests of Italy have been divided between 
the Central Powers and the Allies. 

The neutral States of Europe so far have not been powerful 
enough to exert any appreciable influence on the European market. 
They have been more or less dependent on their larger neighbors. 
The war brought changes in this direction. The Scandinavian na- 
tiofis have accumulated weahh rapidly and their economic influence 
will be felt more acutely after the war, especially as they have, by 
a series of conferences, laid the foundation for a neutral economic 

81 



alliaucf uf their own. (See page 41.) The iNeLheiiands, by 
means of their colossal possessions and the fact that they include 
the mouth of the Rhine, possess economic advantages which may be 
of use after the war. The remaining neutrals have not been able to 
make themselves felt. Their geographical position, which makes it 
impossible for them to combine, rather tends to make their depend 
ence on the larger units still more pronounced in the future. 



EUROPEAN TRANSPORTATION 
RELATIONSHIPS 



The interchange of merchandise among the European nations 
depended before the war upon the upkeep and smooth working of 
shipping and railway traffic not only between contiguous countries, 
but also from one country to another traversing a third. Most of 
the commercial treaties of the newer period contain provisions cov- 
ering shipping and railway traffic or special treaties of navigation 
have been made. The United Kingdom to trade with the European 
continent is interested both in securing for her shipping equitable 
port facilities and favorable treatment for the transport of her mer- 
chandise into and across continental European countries by rail. 

The United Kingdom has fixed her claims with regard to ship- 
ping in several of her commercial treaties of which as an example 
that with the Netherlands is eiven 

The treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands of 
March 27, 1851, says: 

"No duties of tonnage, harbor, lighthouse, pilotage, quarantine or 
other similar or corresponding duties of whatever nature or under what- 
ever denomination shall be imposed in the port of either country upon 
the vessels ot the other country, from whatever port or place arriving 
which shall not be equally imposed in the like cases on national vessels 
and in neither country shall any duty, charge, restriction or prohibition 
be imposed upon, nor any drawback, bounty or allowance, be withheld 
from any goods imported into or exported from each country in vessels 
of the other, which shall not be equally imposed upon or withheld from 
such goods, when so imported or .exported in national vessels." 

The United Kingdom also receives from the national or pri- 
vate railways of the European continent all the facilities for her 
traffic extended to shipments of the same class and on the same 
routes to other nations. 

The Russo-German treaty of commerce and navigation, abro- 
gated by the war, provided, with regard to shipping, that : 

"The German ships and their freights in Russia and the Russian 
ships and their freights in Germany shall be treated like the ships of 
either nation in their own country from wherever they pome and what- 
ever their destination, irrespective of the origin or the destination of 
their freights. 

"Every prerogative and easement which in this respect is extended by 

83 



one of the contracting parties to a tliird one shall also Ije extended auto- 
matically and without condition to the other contracting party." 

Certain exceptions in this respect are made, but the general 
purpose has been to assure freedoni of movement of vessels and 
merchandise. 

For canal traffic, provisions are made giving to ships of one 
of the contracting parties the right to use the facilities of the canal 
of the other, inckiding the locks, at rates applicable equally to all 
shipping. 

Finally, provisions are made for railway traffic : "Both con- 
tracting parties reserve for themselves the right to charge transpor- 
tation rates at their own discretion. However, no differentiation 
shall take place either with regard to the charges for transportation 
nor with regard to time and class between the population of the 
contracting parties. Especially shall not be charged any higher 
rates on German railways for the transportation of Russian goods 
to a point in Germany on or through Germany as will. be charged 
for the same class of German or foreign goods shipped to the same 
destination and on the same road. The same will apply to German 
goods on Russian railways in transit to a point in Russia or through 
Russia." 

Provisions to the same general effect are contained in most of 
the treaties among European nations. 

Foreign Trade Distribution of United States, United 

Kingdom and Germany 

(see also charts II AND III) 

UNITED STATES 

Value in $ % of Total 

Total Export :..... 2.465,884,149 100 

Total Import :........ 1,813,008.234 100 

Export to Allies 1.554,896,752 ' 63.05 

Import from Allies 980,735,960 54.09 

Export to Central Powers 359,105,937 14.56 ' 

Import from Central Powers 321,586,706 17.74 

Export to Neutrals..... 551,381.460 22.38 

Import from Neutrals 510,685,568 28.17 

Export to United Kingdom 597,149,059 23.81 

Import from United Kingdom 295,564,940 16.30 

Export to British Empire 1,131.280,630 45.87 

Import from British Empire 574,382,730 31.68 

Export to Germany.... 331,684,212 13.45 

Import from Germany 188,963.071 10.42 

Export to Europe 1,479,074,761 59.97 

I mport from Europe 892,866,384 49.24 

84 



UNITED KINGDOM 

Value in $ % of Total 

Total Export 3,1 74,1 01,6.30 100 

Total Import 3,843,673,695 100 

Export to Allies 656,091,616 20.67 

Import from Allies 61 1.306.312 15.91 

Export to Central Powers 376,080,405 1 1.85 

Import from Central Powers 236,560,136 6.15 

Export to Neutrals 1.107,318,694 34 88 

Import from Neutrals 2,038,227,772 53.03 

Export to British Empire 1,034,610,915 32.60 

Import from British Empire 957,579.475 28.91 

Export to Germany 300.531,075 9.46 

Import from Germany 254,881,980 6 63 

Export to Europe 1,185,723,125 37.35 

Import from Europe 1.576,703,745 41.80 

GERMANY 

Value in $ % of Total 

Total Export 2,524,500,000 100 

Total Import 2,692.500,000 100 

Export to Allies 961,987.250 38.10 

Import from Allies . 1,189.934,683 44.20 

Export to Central Powers 308,394,500 12.22 

Import from Central Powers 227,549,500 8 43 

Export to Neutrals 1.254,118,067 49.68 

Import from Neutrals 1,275,360.250 47.37 

Export to British Empire 462,250.000 18.31 

Import from British Empire 527,500,000 19 59 

Export to Europe: 1,919,500,000 1(y.Z 

Import from Europe 1,472,000,000 54.67 

Total Turnover of Foreign Trade of the world had, in 1913, a 

value (estimated) of $40,420,000,000 

The total Export Trade of the countries including British col- 
onies represented at the Paris conference had a value of.. * 8,900,000,000 

being 48.90 per cent, of the total export trade of the world. -^ 

♦Estimated from the Statistics of 1011, 1912 and 1913. 



85 



AMERICAN FOREIGN TRADE AFFECTED 
BY THE CONFERENCE 

(see also charts II, III AND iv) 



An analysis of the trade of the United States with the nations 
now at war shows a predominance of the AUied group in both ex- 
port and import. In Table IV a statistical survey is presented of 
sources of supply (imports) and destination of exports. It is fre- 
quently held that the United States is economically self-supporting, 
which, to some extent, is borne out by these figures. Only in rare 
cases does an absolute dependence upon foreign supplies exist, but 
the convenience and economy of the present sources are indisputable 
and directly related, in many instances, to the efficiency of American 
exportation. The effect of the two proposed economic alliances upon 
the normal ebb and flow of commerce between the United States and 
Europe can only be conjectured until the methods of the alliances 
are revealed. If both groups seek to conserve primarily for their 
own use their raw materials, the cost of those materials to the 
United States may conceivably be enhanced either through the law 
of supply and demand or by artificial restrictions, such as export 
duties or prohibition of export as Canadian provinces now prohibit 
exportations of Crown-land pulp woods. 

But the world normally produces never but a little more or less 
than its demand, and it would seem that policies directed to estab- 
lish self-sufficiency in either or both groups would tend to a rear- 
rangement rather than to a denial of supply of raw material. In 
other words, if the Allies endeavor to draw their own materials ex- 
clusively from amang themselves, neutral sources of supply will be 
relied upon by other nations now depending upon the Allies. 

Allies Predominate as Source of Supply 

Of 213 commodities, each of an import value of more than 
$1,000,000 in 1913, 121 were principally imported from nations of 
the Allied group (including the British colonies), while only 49 
principally came from the Central powers. In but 44 cases neutral 
countries were the source of principal supply. This Allied super- 
iority resulted from the United States' extensive importations from 

86 



the British colonies. The United Kingdom (exclusive of the British 
colonies) appears 46 times among the countries of principal supply 
and Germany 45 times. 

An analysis of the countries of destination of 136 commodities, 
each of an export value of more than $2,000,000, in 1913, also 
shows the predominance of the Allied nations. The United King- 
dom alone appears in the list of principal buyers 47 times and 
Canada 48. In 103 cases members of the Allied group were the 
principal buyers. The neutrals were principal buyers of only 19 
commodities and the Central Powers of only 14, all of which went 
to Germany. 

Changes in Character of United States Foreign 

Trade 

IMPORTS 

Pctg. of Pctg. of 
„, . . . total total 

Classihcation Value 1900 Value 1913 1900 1913 

Foodstufifs, raw and food 

animals $97,916,293 $211,746,500 11.52 11.68 

Foodstufifs, partly or 

wholly manufactured.. 133,027,374 194,243,220 15.65 10.72 

Crude materials for use 

use in manufacturing . . 276,241,152 635,210,201 32.50 35.04 

Manufactures for further 

use in manufacturing.. 134,222,045 349,401.928 15.79 19.27 

Manufactures ready for 

consumption 203.126.341 409,178,704 23.90 22 51 

Miscellaneous 5,407,979 14,227,681 .64 .78 

Total $84Q,941,184 $1,813,008,234 

EXPORTS 

Foodstufifs, crude $225,906,246 $181,907,266 16.83 7.49 

Foodstufifs partly or 

wholly manufactured.. 337,152,992 321,204,373 23.09 13.23 

Crude materials for use 

in manufacturing 325,244,296 792,716,109 23.73 34.83 

Manufactures for further 

use in manufacturing.. 148,350,529 408,806,949 10.16 16.83 

Manufactures ready for 

consumption 317.745,673 776,297.360 21,76 31.97 

Miscellaneous 14,894.539 8,531,897 .09 .35 

Total $1,370,763,571 $2,428,506,358 

The outstanding features of the above table are the proportionate 
increases in imports of crude materials and manufactures for further 
use in manufacturing. 

In the fiscal year 1914, ending just before the European War. exported 
foodstufifs dropped to 5.90 per cent, of the total and imports rose to 13.08. 
the United States importing more foodstufifs than it exported by about $110,- 
000,000. Exports of crude materials also proportionately increased. 

While there was before the war a natural increase in the im- 

87 



ports of foodstuffs into the United States, the dependence of the 
United States upon other countries in this case is not a vital matter 
as they consist mostly of specialties which might be dispensed with 
in time of need. Tea and coffee are possible exceptions. Viewing 
the supply of foodstuff's from foreign countries under the aspect of 
the formation of self -containing- economic units in Piurope it appears 
that no actual dependence of this country upon either of the groups 
in formation exists. Italy supplies nearly all the macaroni of for- 
eign origin but the home industry would very well be able to take 
care of that industry, if necessary. Also olive oil comes in very 
large quantities from Italy. Spain might become a strong competi- 
tor, if there must be a foreign supply. Brazil and Colombia have 
supplied most of the coffee. Bananas come from Jamaica, but Costa 
Rica, Honduras and Panama together supply recently twice as much 
as the first named country. Lemons are imported nearly exclusively 
from Italy, but the Italian lemon might be dispensed with in favor 
of the home product. Tea is reaching us from Japan, India and 
other sources, mostly British. The leading neutral supplier in this 
case is China. Owing to the dift'erence in flavor between the Indian 
product and that supplied by China it is doubtful whether the former 
could be replaced by the latter. Finally the import of tobacco must 
be mentioned in this connection. It is the only case where the cen- 
tral nations group has a considerable influence on the supply of 
foodstuffs, if tobacco may be so called ; owing to the large import of 
Tukish tobaccos reaching the American market. 

Export Needs Sustained Supply 

A secure supply of raw materials and partly manufactured goods 
is essential to the future export trade. From 1900 to 1913 the in- 
crease in importation of raw materials was 229%, and in manu- 
factures for further use in manufacturing 260%. The import of 
manufactures ready for consumption has increased 208%. The 
shortage in the supply of several materials used for industrial pur- 
poses in this country since the outbreak of the war has disclosed 
the fact that the United States manufacturing industry is not com- 
pletely self-supporting. Coal tar dyes were imported practically 
exclusively from Germany. Switzerland in both cases might act as 
a substitute, but the small Swiss dye industry hardly could take care 
of the large deficit which would result through a sudden stop of the 
German supplies. The U. S. Congress is now moving definitely to 
encouragement and protection of the domestic industry. 

88 



The Entente Allies by means of their large territorial expan^ 
sion and the vastness of their natural resources naturally are of 
larger importance in the supply of the American industry with raw 
materials than the Central powers. Creosote oil, copal, shellac may 
be mentioned in this connection only to give a few examples of im^ 
ports of minor value. In the case of rubber the superiority of the 
English plantation possessions in the East has a deciding influence 
on the whole American rubber industry, notwithstanding that the 
Eastern supply might be supplemented by considerable imports from 
Brazil. Nitrate of soda is supplied by Chile. For jute British India 
is the main source of supply. Germany supplies different fertilizers 
which in some cases can be obtained from that country only. 

The Allied group, however, shows its predominance again in the 
leather market. The ore resources stored in this country are so 
large that there can hardly exist a dependence of any of the groups 
of powers now at war, especially as in nearly all the important cases 
there are prominent neutral countries which could be drawn on in 
case of necessity. In the case of manganese where British India 
and Russia during 1913 were the principal suppliers, supplies are 
being increasingly drawn from Brazil. For nickel, however, the 
United States is practically entirely dependent on Allied sources. 
From 1911 to 1913 nickel was imported only from Canada and to 
an extremely small percentage also from Belgium. Also in tin a 
strong dependence from foreign supplies has to be noted and atten- 
tion is being given development of neutral resources. About five- 
sixths of the required foreign supplies came from British sources 
either via England or from the Straits Settlements. The small sup- 
plies coming from Germany and Holland would hardly recompense 
this country for the deficit it would suffer in case of an interruption 
of the supply coming from the two markets mentioned before. The 
silk consumed by the American silk industry comes mostly from 
Japan and Italy, China supplying only about one-eighth of the pres- 
ent import. 

United States Nearly Self-Supporting 

Dependence in regard to manufactures in a country developed 
industrially as highly as the United States can seldom arise except 
under economic stress. In normal times the import of manufactured 
goods as a rule has to be regarded more as a convenience or a mat- 
ter of competition where the exporting country has better facilities 
for production than the importing country. It seems that none of 

89 



the goods chiefly imported into this country during 1913 really need 
be imported or could be done without for a prolonged period by 
using accumulated stocks if it should become imperative in the inter- 
est of the nation to dispense with such imports. The development 
of American industry has been one of opportunity, convenience and 
economy. American manufacturers, therefore, have abstained fre- 
quently from making goods the manufacture of wdiich did not seem 
profitable under American conditions and have left it to the im- 
porters to supply the real or imaginary needs of the country. When 
two years ago the regularity of this convenient supply was checked, 
a shortage of certain supplies existed until the American industry 
adjusted itself to new conditions. 



90 



DESTINATION OF EXPORTS 

(see chart iv) 



In analyzing- the destination of exports, two groups of goods 
are to be considered: those indispensable to other countries and 
those which are brought either as a matter of convenience or 
economy. That the first group must have to be bought from this 
country until they can be replaced by similar articles produced else- 
where or by a substitute. The second group will be bought only 
as long as it remains convenient for the buyer. Foodstuffs and raw 
materials belong mostly to the first class, manufactured goods to 
the second. Exports of copper reaching a value of over $120,000,000 
in 1913 and steadily increasing are at least for Germany a consider- 
able necessity, also for France, and England might not feel in- 
clined to lose this convenient and regular source of supply. From 
two-thirds to three-quarters of the English and German cotton 
imports come from the United States. England and Germany are 
the largest buyers of American cotton, the former taking it in 1913 
to the value of $224,000,000, the latter for $144,000,000. France, 
in 1913, took $66,676,149 worth of cotton, and Italy, with $30,169,- 
663, stood fourth. Nearly half of American oil exports go to the 
countries of the Entente Alliance while Germany takes one-eleventh. 
Neutral countries are large buyers and no difficulty would arise 
in distributing a larger quota to the neutrals. The same applies to 
other oil products sold by this country. Half of the linseed produc- 
tion was taken by Germany. 

Allies Largest Buyers 

Both the Central Powers and the Allies have been considerable 
buyers of foodstuffs in this country before the war, but the Allies, 
of course, required larger quantities. The possession of large food- 
producing territories by the allied powers might render those coun- 
tries more or less independent of the American supply. The Cen- 
tral Powers, while buying fairly large quantities, nevertheless have 
no deciding influence on the situation. Plowever, it must be taken 
into consideration that neutral countries have been great customers 
for American agricultural produce. If by some artificial influence 
upon the food distribution of the world a larger percentage of Brit- 
ish foodstuffs should flow into the countries of the Entente Allies 

91 



this would lead to a corresponding reduction of the British supply 
to neutral markets which in consequence would become available 
markets for American produce. Many of the European neutrals 
were already large customers for wheat and wheat flour before the 
war. Bacon went largely to the United Kingdom, lard to the 
United Kingdom and Germany, while tobacco was taken by the two 
markets mentioned and others. The Netherlands is a prominent 
neutral customer. 

Among the manufactured goods certain machines are taking a 
favorable position in the export trade. American agricultural ma- 
chinery has established itself throughout the world. The fact 
that many American machines of various types are not always ob- 
tainable anywhere else may free them from the restrictions of com- 
petition. Export of automobiles is steadily increasing not only be- 
cause of the excellence of the American product, but because in 
countries like Argentina, American sales methods are teaching the 
farmers to use them as they do in the United States. The export 
of cotton goods takes place in competition with European commodi- 
ties of the same class. American manufacturers find a market for 
those goods mostly in neutral covmtries outside Europe. Their sales 
therefore would not be affected directly by any grouping of the 
countries now at war, but the upkeep of proper transportation fa- 
cilities may become a very important factor in the sale of all those 
goods abroad after the war. England and Canada so far have 
proved themselves the best customers of the American rubber in- 
dustry. The fact that Canada belongs to the Entente Alliance gives 
that group generally a great superiority as a customer for manufac- 
tured goods of United States origin. 



92 



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126 



APPENDIX A 

The National Foreign Trade Council, at its Third Annual Meet- 
ing in New York City, September 21, 1916, adopted the following 
Resolution: 

"Whereas, The United States offers, normally, a steadily increas- 
ing market for the products of countries which require a foreign sup- 
ply of articles which are produced in the United States and its posses- 
sions, and 

"Whereas, The extension of the foreign trade of the United 
States, as a safeguard against domestic depression largely depends 
upon favorable tariff treatment of American exports and their freedom 
from foreign discrimination in favor of like products of competing 
nations, and 

"Whereas, As a result of the European war European Economic 
Alliances have been formed and are proposed, which by establishing 
tariff preferences among their members, would discriminate against 
neutrals, and 

"Whereas, Approximately three-fourths of normal American for- 
eign trade is with the belligerents, whose commercial treaties regulat- 
ing tariff relations will be revised after the war, and cannot escape 
the effect of far-reaching changes of tariff policy on their part, espe- 
cially since all European governments, except the British, maintain 
tariffs devised for concessions or retaliation in the interest of foreign 
trade and a possibility exists of the establishment of a tariff in the 
United Kingdom affording a basis for preferential agreements with 
markets whose needs the United States desires more largely to sup- 
ply, and 

"Whereas, American labor and producers are entitled to every 
resource of government policy necessary to preserve and extend their 
share of foreign markets in return for the market here afforded foreign 
products ; therefore, be it. 

"Resolved, That the National Foreign Trade Council bring urgently 
to the attention of the President, the Congress and the Tariff Commis- 
sion, when organized, the necessity that the American tariff system, 
whatever be its underlying principle, shall possess adequate resources 
for the encouragement of the foreign trade of the United States by 
commercial treaties or agreements or executive concessions within 
defined limits and its protection from undue discrimination in the 
markets of the world. And be it further 

"Resolved, That the National Foreign Trade Council continue its 
investigation of the effect of European Economic Alliances upon the 
foreign commerce of the United States, and related subjects, with a 
view of placing its findings before the United States Tariff Commission 
when organized, or before the President or Congress, as may be deemed 
expedient, and that the Council co-operate with other organizations in 
the interest of a better public understanding of the foreign trade aspect 
of the tariff problem." 

127 



OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY THL 

NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL 

°"' caS?e"Sf*rc':in^y . ^^ "^ ^^^"'^'■"' Vice-President of the International Mer- 

:f XS^EEEB^-- ^^^^ fe ^fceiS.. t. 
^°^"!an^lSSn^r.5nfrc"fp"or^trnV' '^^'^■"-'^ S^-^""^'' Vice-President of the Ameri- 
"The Panama Canal and Latin American Trade Possibilities," by Edward N. Hurley. 

Price ..... $1.50 
Proceedings of the Second National Foreign Trade Convention. 1915, containing 
AiK T> T 1 T, ., addresses by 

Hon W ^r R^^f ff^cjd^"*' Baldwin Locomotive W«rks; 
.V°"- ^. C. Redfield, Secretary of Commerce; 
Ihe Problems of War and Commerce," by Hon. John Bassett Moore- 
Government Regulation of Commerce as AffectiniFordln Trade "hv W r Qo ^ 
'TroblSs"oT'^he^''^,''°';;^ °^*'^^ mgerson-RaL Comlfan^y "few '^orY; "^ ^'""'^'"■ 
Se •' bv Wnillm pM^""f^<=turer and Merchant in the Development of Foreign 

..^, Mr!'li C'.\^i^r Ma'nag^rNatiS^'pa'pl^r'l ^yTSiar^'^ ""' ""^"= '^' 
^'" Sfel^Co'rp^oSr ^""'^"^ ^"^^'" ''^ ^^-- Ar''lar?en,''V7esident. United States 

Price $1,50 

'■w frT^'^i"^^''^*''^ ^^'''^ ^''*'''"''' ^'"'^^■^« ^''^'^^ Co„t,^„n-«„, 1916, containing 
^""""'iJl^t L^comotivl Works-*'^ ^"^°''^^" ^^^■" ^^ ^'^^ ^^ J^^nson, President, 

':!^/^^J^^'4^"^^ Foreign Trade," by James A. 

,:^'fi^^^^ni;'^JS'^^^^^l^:-^^ War," by Willard Straight. 

"^'^ UniSrStaLs^M^ra-"^^^'^'^^'""'" ^' «^"^^ C- E™"^'' f— Chairman 

"Necessity for an American Dye Stuffs Industry to Aid Export Trade in Textiles " bv 

Henry Howard, President, Merrimac Chemical Company, Boston- ^^^"'^^' "^ 

'^°""HTr;ila^f,^rp"an?^S^°^£|.!.ls^"'^''' '^ ^^"^^^ D.^ij;;m?nt"pVesident, Simmons 
"The ?-;--ec"o'^-d^4^e;Shippin^,^ Hon. Edwin F. Sweet. Assistant Secre- 

^ Frand?cor' °^ ^ ^^''°"'' S'^'PP'"^ Policy," by Captain Robert Dollar, San 

"^''^°Mi;°;^P"p'°" *° ^^''^ World Trade Conditions After the War," by M A Oudin 
::ExporfS^e\?/X%^ftrT;rtlal^^ly^^^^^^^^ Cit! ' 

°^^^Sr S^pJly^C^o-SrW^Lfui^s^'- ^^"^"^ ^-- '• " T^ W t- L^en 
Z^'^rillntF^^-rent^'i^^^^^^ °^ ^-^ign Trade," by Fairfax 

'""'/aiioTafcity' Srilew yX ^"'^^ ^°"'=^'" '^ ^^^"'^ ^^ ^-'^""P' P-^'^^-' 
"*^°"°^CommLion.^°"'^" ^''''^''" ''^' ^°"- ^°''P^ ^- °^^'"' Chairman Federal Trade 

Price ..... ^i.50 

"National Foreign Trade" (monthly), the official bulletin of the Council 
rree to persons with a direct interest in foreign trade 

''^""'enc'^'lo"£' Frl'rei^^^' ^""Tlf °/t ^^""e" Transportation with Particular Refer- 
ence to the J:"oreign Trade of the United States. 

Free to persons having a direct interest in foreign trade. 
Statement of the National Foreign Trade Council on the Government Shipping Bill of 1916 

Free, 

^^^°''Vm,npfi ^nn'"l^»"w'',"KS?"nP^''^i'°"-'-" ^orcign Trade of the National Foreign Trade 
Council on the Webb Bill authorizing combinations for export trade. 

Free. 

"^""^^.^K^'^^? ^^a'^^°°K' ^ compilation of information and statistics regarding the 
ArSirican RepubS ^^'^" commerce and railway development of the South 

Price ..... $.25 

International Commercial Policies After the European War. A study of the proposed 
European Economic Alliance and its effect upon the United States. P-^oPOsea 

tree to persons having direct interest in foreign trade. 

The above may be ordered from the Secretary, 

NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, 

India House, Hanover Square, 

New York City. 

128 



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